| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
LoongArch: csum: Fix OoB access in IP checksum code for negative lengths
Commit 69e3a6aa6be2 ("LoongArch: Add checksum optimization for 64-bit
system") would cause an undefined shift and an out-of-bounds read.
Commit 8bd795fedb84 ("arm64: csum: Fix OoB access in IP checksum code
for negative lengths") fixes the same issue on ARM64. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usbnet: ipheth: fix possible overflow in DPE length check
Originally, it was possible for the DPE length check to overflow if
wDatagramIndex + wDatagramLength > U16_MAX. This could lead to an OoB
read.
Move the wDatagramIndex term to the other side of the inequality.
An existing condition ensures that wDatagramIndex < urb->actual_length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usbnet: ipheth: use static NDP16 location in URB
Original code allowed for the start of NDP16 to be anywhere within the
URB based on the `wNdpIndex` value in NTH16. Only the start position of
NDP16 was checked, so it was possible for even the fixed-length part
of NDP16 to extend past the end of URB, leading to an out-of-bounds
read.
On iOS devices, the NDP16 header always directly follows NTH16. Rely on
and check for this specific format.
This, along with NCM-specific minimal URB length check that already
exists, will ensure that the fixed-length part of NDP16 plus a set
amount of DPEs fit within the URB.
Note that this commit alone does not fully address the OoB read.
The limit on the amount of DPEs needs to be enforced separately. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usbnet: ipheth: fix DPE OoB read
Fix an out-of-bounds DPE read, limit the number of processed DPEs to
the amount that fits into the fixed-size NDP16 header. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: hns3: fixed hclge_fetch_pf_reg accesses bar space out of bounds issue
The TQP BAR space is divided into two segments. TQPs 0-1023 and TQPs
1024-1279 are in different BAR space addresses. However,
hclge_fetch_pf_reg does not distinguish the tqp space information when
reading the tqp space information. When the number of TQPs is greater
than 1024, access bar space overwriting occurs.
The problem of different segments has been considered during the
initialization of tqp.io_base. Therefore, tqp.io_base is directly used
when the queue is read in hclge_fetch_pf_reg.
The error message:
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffff800037200000
pc : hclge_fetch_pf_reg+0x138/0x250 [hclge]
lr : hclge_get_regs+0x84/0x1d0 [hclge]
Call trace:
hclge_fetch_pf_reg+0x138/0x250 [hclge]
hclge_get_regs+0x84/0x1d0 [hclge]
hns3_get_regs+0x2c/0x50 [hns3]
ethtool_get_regs+0xf4/0x270
dev_ethtool+0x674/0x8a0
dev_ioctl+0x270/0x36c
sock_do_ioctl+0x110/0x2a0
sock_ioctl+0x2ac/0x530
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa8/0x100
invoke_syscall+0x4c/0x124
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x140/0x15c
do_el0_svc+0x30/0xd0
el0_svc+0x1c/0x2c
el0_sync_handler+0xb0/0xb4
el0_sync+0x168/0x180 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mtd: spinand: winbond: Fix 512GW, 01GW, 01JW and 02JW ECC information
These four chips:
* W25N512GW
* W25N01GW
* W25N01JW
* W25N02JW
all require a single bit of ECC strength and thus feature an on-die
Hamming-like ECC engine. There is no point in filling a ->get_status()
callback for them because the main ECC status bytes are located in
standard places, and retrieving the number of bitflips in case of
corrected chunk is both useless and unsupported (if there are bitflips,
then there is 1 at most, so no need to query the chip for that).
Without this change, a kernel warning triggers every time a bit flips. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/CPU/AMD: Terminate the erratum_1386_microcode array
The erratum_1386_microcode array requires an empty entry at the end.
Otherwise x86_match_cpu_with_stepping() will continue iterate the array after
it ended.
Add an empty entry to erratum_1386_microcode to its end. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
binder: fix OOB in binder_add_freeze_work()
In binder_add_freeze_work() we iterate over the proc->nodes with the
proc->inner_lock held. However, this lock is temporarily dropped to
acquire the node->lock first (lock nesting order). This can race with
binder_deferred_release() which removes the nodes from the proc->nodes
rbtree and adds them into binder_dead_nodes list. This leads to a broken
iteration in binder_add_freeze_work() as rb_next() will use data from
binder_dead_nodes, triggering an out-of-bounds access:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in rb_next+0xfc/0x124
Read of size 8 at addr ffffcb84285f7170 by task freeze/660
CPU: 8 UID: 0 PID: 660 Comm: freeze Not tainted 6.11.0-07343-ga727812a8d45 #18
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
rb_next+0xfc/0x124
binder_add_freeze_work+0x344/0x534
binder_ioctl+0x1e70/0x25ac
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0x124/0x190
The buggy address belongs to the variable:
binder_dead_nodes+0x10/0x40
[...]
==================================================================
This is possible because proc->nodes (rbtree) and binder_dead_nodes
(list) share entries in binder_node through a union:
struct binder_node {
[...]
union {
struct rb_node rb_node;
struct hlist_node dead_node;
};
Fix the race by checking that the proc is still alive. If not, simply
break out of the iteration. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: kvm: Fix out-of-bounds array access
In kvm_riscv_vcpu_sbi_init() the entry->ext_idx can contain an
out-of-bound index. This is used as a special marker for the base
extensions, that cannot be disabled. However, when traversing the
extensions, that special marker is not checked prior indexing the
array.
Add an out-of-bounds check to the function. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: Fix a buffer overflow in mgmt_mesh_add()
Smatch Warning:
net/bluetooth/mgmt_util.c:375 mgmt_mesh_add() error: __memcpy()
'mesh_tx->param' too small (48 vs 50)
Analysis:
'mesh_tx->param' is array of size 48. This is the destination.
u8 param[sizeof(struct mgmt_cp_mesh_send) + 29]; // 19 + 29 = 48.
But in the caller 'mesh_send' we reject only when len > 50.
len > (MGMT_MESH_SEND_SIZE + 31) // 19 + 31 = 50. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
block: Fix handling of offline queues in blk_mq_alloc_request_hctx()
This patch prevents that test nvme/004 triggers the following:
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in block/blk-mq.h:135:9
index 512 is out of range for type 'long unsigned int [512]'
Call Trace:
show_stack+0x52/0x58
dump_stack_lvl+0x49/0x5e
dump_stack+0x10/0x12
ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x3b
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x44/0x49
blk_mq_alloc_request_hctx+0x304/0x310
__nvme_submit_sync_cmd+0x70/0x200 [nvme_core]
nvmf_connect_io_queue+0x23e/0x2a0 [nvme_fabrics]
nvme_loop_connect_io_queues+0x8d/0xb0 [nvme_loop]
nvme_loop_create_ctrl+0x58e/0x7d0 [nvme_loop]
nvmf_create_ctrl+0x1d7/0x4d0 [nvme_fabrics]
nvmf_dev_write+0xae/0x111 [nvme_fabrics]
vfs_write+0x144/0x560
ksys_write+0xb7/0x140
__x64_sys_write+0x42/0x50
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
exfat: check if cluster num is valid
Syzbot reported slab-out-of-bounds read in exfat_clear_bitmap.
This was triggered by reproducer calling truncute with size 0,
which causes the following trace:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in exfat_clear_bitmap+0x147/0x490 fs/exfat/balloc.c:174
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888115aa9508 by task syz-executor251/365
Call Trace:
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:77 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x1e2/0x24b lib/dump_stack.c:118
print_address_description+0x81/0x3c0 mm/kasan/report.c:233
__kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:419 [inline]
kasan_report+0x1a4/0x1f0 mm/kasan/report.c:436
__asan_report_load8_noabort+0x14/0x20 mm/kasan/report_generic.c:309
exfat_clear_bitmap+0x147/0x490 fs/exfat/balloc.c:174
exfat_free_cluster+0x25a/0x4a0 fs/exfat/fatent.c:181
__exfat_truncate+0x99e/0xe00 fs/exfat/file.c:217
exfat_truncate+0x11b/0x4f0 fs/exfat/file.c:243
exfat_setattr+0xa03/0xd40 fs/exfat/file.c:339
notify_change+0xb76/0xe10 fs/attr.c:336
do_truncate+0x1ea/0x2d0 fs/open.c:65
Move the is_valid_cluster() helper from fatent.c to a common
header to make it reusable in other *.c files. And add is_valid_cluster()
to validate if cluster number is within valid range in exfat_clear_bitmap()
and exfat_set_bitmap(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: isp1760: Fix out-of-bounds array access
Running the driver through kasan gives an interesting splat:
BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in isp1760_register+0x180/0x70c
Read of size 20 at addr f1db2e64 by task swapper/0/1
(...)
isp1760_register from isp1760_plat_probe+0x1d8/0x220
(...)
This happens because the loop reading the regmap fields for the
different ISP1760 variants look like this:
for (i = 0; i < HC_FIELD_MAX; i++) { ... }
Meaning it expects the arrays to be at least HC_FIELD_MAX - 1 long.
However the arrays isp1760_hc_reg_fields[], isp1763_hc_reg_fields[],
isp1763_hc_volatile_ranges[] and isp1763_dc_volatile_ranges[] are
dynamically sized during compilation.
Fix this by putting an empty assignment to the [HC_FIELD_MAX]
and [DC_FIELD_MAX] array member at the end of each array.
This will make the array one member longer than it needs to be,
but avoids the risk of overwriting whatever is inside
[HC_FIELD_MAX - 1] and is simple and intuitive to read. Also
add comments explaining what is going on. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix potential array overflow in bpf_trampoline_get_progs()
The cnt value in the 'cnt >= BPF_MAX_TRAMP_PROGS' check does not
include BPF_TRAMP_MODIFY_RETURN bpf programs, so the number of
the attached BPF_TRAMP_MODIFY_RETURN bpf programs in a trampoline
can exceed BPF_MAX_TRAMP_PROGS.
When this happens, the assignment '*progs++ = aux->prog' in
bpf_trampoline_get_progs() will cause progs array overflow as the
progs field in the bpf_tramp_progs struct can only hold at most
BPF_MAX_TRAMP_PROGS bpf programs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: pvrusb2: fix array-index-out-of-bounds in pvr2_i2c_core_init
Syzbot reported that -1 is used as array index. The problem was in
missing validation check.
hdw->unit_number is initialized with -1 and then if init table walk fails
this value remains unchanged. Since code blindly uses this member for
array indexing adding sanity check is the easiest fix for that.
hdw->workpoll initialization moved upper to prevent warning in
__flush_work. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rtw89: cfo: check mac_id to avoid out-of-bounds
Somehow, hardware reports incorrect mac_id and pollute memory. Check index
before we access the array.
UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in rtw89/phy.c:2517:23
index 188 is out of range for type 's32 [64]'
CPU: 1 PID: 51550 Comm: irq/35-rtw89_pc Tainted: G OE
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
show_stack+0x52/0x58
dump_stack_lvl+0x4c/0x63
dump_stack+0x10/0x12
ubsan_epilogue+0x9/0x45
__ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds.cold+0x44/0x49
? __alloc_skb+0x92/0x1d0
rtw89_phy_cfo_parse+0x44/0x7f [rtw89_core]
rtw89_core_rx+0x261/0x871 [rtw89_core]
? __alloc_skb+0xee/0x1d0
rtw89_pci_napi_poll+0x3fa/0x4ea [rtw89_pci]
__napi_poll+0x33/0x1a0
net_rx_action+0x126/0x260
? __queue_work+0x217/0x4c0
__do_softirq+0xd9/0x315
? disable_irq_nosync+0x10/0x10
do_softirq.part.0+0x6d/0x90
</IRQ>
<TASK>
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x62/0x70
rtw89_pci_interrupt_threadfn+0x182/0x1a6 [rtw89_pci]
irq_thread_fn+0x28/0x60
irq_thread+0xc8/0x190
? irq_thread_fn+0x60/0x60
kthread+0x16b/0x190
? irq_thread_check_affinity+0xe0/0xe0
? set_kthread_struct+0x50/0x50
ret_from_fork+0x22/0x30
</TASK> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
um: Fix out-of-bounds read in LDT setup
syscall_stub_data() expects the data_count parameter to be the number of
longs, not bytes.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in syscall_stub_data+0x70/0xe0
Read of size 128 at addr 000000006411f6f0 by task swapper/1
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Not tainted 5.18.0+ #18
Call Trace:
show_stack.cold+0x166/0x2a7
__dump_stack+0x3a/0x43
dump_stack_lvl+0x1f/0x27
print_report.cold+0xdb/0xf81
kasan_report+0x119/0x1f0
kasan_check_range+0x3a3/0x440
memcpy+0x52/0x140
syscall_stub_data+0x70/0xe0
write_ldt_entry+0xac/0x190
init_new_ldt+0x515/0x960
init_new_context+0x2c4/0x4d0
mm_init.constprop.0+0x5ed/0x760
mm_alloc+0x118/0x170
0x60033f48
do_one_initcall+0x1d7/0x860
0x60003e7b
kernel_init+0x6e/0x3d4
new_thread_handler+0x1e7/0x2c0
The buggy address belongs to stack of task swapper/1
and is located at offset 64 in frame:
init_new_ldt+0x0/0x960
This frame has 2 objects:
[32, 40) 'addr'
[64, 80) 'desc'
================================================================== |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ethernet: mtk_eth_soc: out of bounds read in mtk_hwlro_get_fdir_entry()
The "fsp->location" variable comes from user via ethtool_get_rxnfc().
Check that it is valid to prevent an out of bounds read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/dp: Fix OOB read when handling Post Cursor2 register
The link_status array was not large enough to read the Adjust Request
Post Cursor2 register, so remove the common helper function to avoid
an OOB read, found with a -Warray-bounds build:
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_helper.c: In function 'drm_dp_get_adjust_request_post_cursor':
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_helper.c:59:27: error: array subscript 10 is outside array bounds of 'const u8[6]' {aka 'const unsigned char[6]'} [-Werror=array-bounds]
59 | return link_status[r - DP_LANE0_1_STATUS];
| ~~~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
drivers/gpu/drm/drm_dp_helper.c:147:51: note: while referencing 'link_status'
147 | u8 drm_dp_get_adjust_request_post_cursor(const u8 link_status[DP_LINK_STATUS_SIZE],
| ~~~~~~~~~^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Replace the only user of the helper with an open-coded fetch and decode,
similar to drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc_link_dp.c. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
clk: visconti: prevent array overflow in visconti_clk_register_gates()
This code was using -1 to represent that there was no reset function.
Unfortunately, the -1 was stored in u8 so the if (clks[i].rs_id >= 0)
condition was always true. This lead to an out of bounds access in
visconti_clk_register_gates(). |
