| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: cs_dsp: Fix OOB memory read access in KUnit test
KASAN reported out of bounds access - cs_dsp_mock_bin_add_name_or_info(),
because the source string length was rounded up to the allocation size. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eth: fbnic: avoid double free when failing to DMA-map FW msg
The semantics are that caller of fbnic_mbx_map_msg() retains
the ownership of the message on error. All existing callers
dutifully free the page. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7996: drop fragments with multicast or broadcast RA
IEEE 802.11 fragmentation can only be applied to unicast frames.
Therefore, drop fragments with multicast or broadcast RA. This patch
addresses vulnerabilities such as CVE-2020-26145. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
eventpoll: don't decrement ep refcount while still holding the ep mutex
Jann Horn points out that epoll is decrementing the ep refcount and then
doing a
mutex_unlock(&ep->mtx);
afterwards. That's very wrong, because it can lead to a use-after-free.
That pattern is actually fine for the very last reference, because the
code in question will delay the actual call to "ep_free(ep)" until after
it has unlocked the mutex.
But it's wrong for the much subtler "next to last" case when somebody
*else* may also be dropping their reference and free the ep while we're
still using the mutex.
Note that this is true even if that other user is also using the same ep
mutex: mutexes, unlike spinlocks, can not be used for object ownership,
even if they guarantee mutual exclusion.
A mutex "unlock" operation is not atomic, and as one user is still
accessing the mutex as part of unlocking it, another user can come in
and get the now released mutex and free the data structure while the
first user is still cleaning up.
See our mutex documentation in Documentation/locking/mutex-design.rst,
in particular the section [1] about semantics:
"mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure even after it has
internally released the lock already - so it's not safe for
another context to acquire the mutex and assume that the
mutex_unlock() context is not using the structure anymore"
So if we drop our ep ref before the mutex unlock, but we weren't the
last one, we may then unlock the mutex, another user comes in, drops
_their_ reference and releases the 'ep' as it now has no users - all
while the mutex_unlock() is still accessing it.
Fix this by simply moving the ep refcount dropping to outside the mutex:
the refcount itself is atomic, and doesn't need mutex protection (that's
the whole _point_ of refcounts: unlike mutexes, they are inherently
about object lifetimes). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86/hyper-v: Skip non-canonical addresses during PV TLB flush
In KVM guests with Hyper-V hypercalls enabled, the hypercalls
HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST and HVCALL_FLUSH_VIRTUAL_ADDRESS_LIST_EX
allow a guest to request invalidation of portions of a virtual TLB.
For this, the hypercall parameter includes a list of GVAs that are supposed
to be invalidated.
However, when non-canonical GVAs are passed, there is currently no
filtering in place and they are eventually passed to checked invocations of
INVVPID on Intel / INVLPGA on AMD. While AMD's INVLPGA silently ignores
non-canonical addresses (effectively a no-op), Intel's INVVPID explicitly
signals VM-Fail and ultimately triggers the WARN_ONCE in invvpid_error():
invvpid failed: ext=0x0 vpid=1 gva=0xaaaaaaaaaaaaa000
WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 326 at arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:482
invvpid_error+0x91/0xa0 [kvm_intel]
Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm 9pnet_virtio irqbypass fuse
CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 326 Comm: kvm-vm Not tainted 6.15.0 #14 PREEMPT(voluntary)
RIP: 0010:invvpid_error+0x91/0xa0 [kvm_intel]
Call Trace:
vmx_flush_tlb_gva+0x320/0x490 [kvm_intel]
kvm_hv_vcpu_flush_tlb+0x24f/0x4f0 [kvm]
kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x3013/0x5810 [kvm]
Hyper-V documents that invalid GVAs (those that are beyond a partition's
GVA space) are to be ignored. While not completely clear whether this
ruling also applies to non-canonical GVAs, it is likely fine to make that
assumption, and manual testing on Azure confirms "real" Hyper-V interprets
the specification in the same way.
Skip non-canonical GVAs when processing the list of address to avoid
tripping the INVVPID failure. Alternatively, KVM could filter out "bad"
GVAs before inserting into the FIFO, but practically speaking the only
downside of pushing validation to the final processing is that doing so
is suboptimal for the guest, and no well-behaved guest will request TLB
flushes for non-canonical addresses. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: Fix taking invalid lock on wedge
If device wedges on e.g. GuC upload, the submission is not yet enabled
and the state is not even initialized. Protect the wedge call so it does
nothing in this case. It fixes the following splat:
[] xe 0000:bf:00.0: [drm] device wedged, needs recovery
[] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[] DEBUG_LOCKS_WARN_ON(lock->magic != lock)
[] WARNING: CPU: 48 PID: 312 at kernel/locking/mutex.c:564 __mutex_lock+0x8a1/0xe60
...
[] RIP: 0010:__mutex_lock+0x8a1/0xe60
[] mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[] xe_guc_submit_wedge+0x80/0x2b0 [xe] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe: Process deferred GGTT node removals on device unwind
While we are indirectly draining our dedicated workqueue ggtt->wq
that we use to complete asynchronous removal of some GGTT nodes,
this happends as part of the managed-drm unwinding (ggtt_fini_early),
which could be later then manage-device unwinding, where we could
already unmap our MMIO/GMS mapping (mmio_fini).
This was recently observed during unsuccessful VF initialization:
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: probe with driver xe failed with error -62
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: DEVRES REL ffff88811e747340 __xe_bo_unpin_map_no_vm (16 bytes)
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: DEVRES REL ffff88811e747540 __xe_bo_unpin_map_no_vm (16 bytes)
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: DEVRES REL ffff88811e747240 __xe_bo_unpin_map_no_vm (16 bytes)
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: DEVRES REL ffff88811e747040 tiles_fini (16 bytes)
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: DEVRES REL ffff88811e746840 mmio_fini (16 bytes)
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: DEVRES REL ffff88811e747f40 xe_bo_pinned_fini (16 bytes)
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: DEVRES REL ffff88811e746b40 devm_drm_dev_init_release (16 bytes)
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: [drm:drm_managed_release] drmres release begin
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: [drm:drm_managed_release] REL ffff88810ef81640 __fini_relay (8 bytes)
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: [drm:drm_managed_release] REL ffff88810ef80d40 guc_ct_fini (8 bytes)
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: [drm:drm_managed_release] REL ffff88810ef80040 __drmm_mutex_release (8 bytes)
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: [drm:drm_managed_release] REL ffff88810ef80140 ggtt_fini_early (8 bytes)
and this was leading to:
[ ] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc900058162a0
[ ] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[ ] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[ ] Oops: Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ ] Tainted: [W]=WARN
[ ] Workqueue: xe-ggtt-wq ggtt_node_remove_work_func [xe]
[ ] RIP: 0010:xe_ggtt_set_pte+0x6d/0x350 [xe]
[ ] Call Trace:
[ ] <TASK>
[ ] xe_ggtt_clear+0xb0/0x270 [xe]
[ ] ggtt_node_remove+0xbb/0x120 [xe]
[ ] ggtt_node_remove_work_func+0x30/0x50 [xe]
[ ] process_one_work+0x22b/0x6f0
[ ] worker_thread+0x1e8/0x3d
Add managed-device action that will explicitly drain the workqueue
with all pending node removals prior to releasing MMIO/GSM mapping.
(cherry picked from commit 89d2835c3680ab1938e22ad81b1c9f8c686bd391) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/guc: Explicitly exit CT safe mode on unwind
During driver probe we might be briefly using CT safe mode, which
is based on a delayed work, but usually we are able to stop this
once we have IRQ fully operational. However, if we abort the probe
quite early then during unwind we might try to destroy the workqueue
while there is still a pending delayed work that attempts to restart
itself which triggers a WARN.
This was recently observed during unsuccessful VF initialization:
[ ] xe 0000:00:02.1: probe with driver xe failed with error -62
[ ] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ ] workqueue: cannot queue safe_mode_worker_func [xe] on wq xe-g2h-wq
[ ] WARNING: CPU: 9 PID: 0 at kernel/workqueue.c:2257 __queue_work+0x287/0x710
[ ] RIP: 0010:__queue_work+0x287/0x710
[ ] Call Trace:
[ ] delayed_work_timer_fn+0x19/0x30
[ ] call_timer_fn+0xa1/0x2a0
Exit the CT safe mode on unwind to avoid that warning.
(cherry picked from commit 2ddbb73ec20b98e70a5200cb85deade22ccea2ec) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/qedr: Fix potential memory leak in __qedr_alloc_mr()
__qedr_alloc_mr() allocates a memory chunk for "mr->info.pbl_table" with
init_mr_info(). When rdma_alloc_tid() and rdma_register_tid() fail, "mr"
is released while "mr->info.pbl_table" is not released, which will lead
to a memory leak.
We should release the "mr->info.pbl_table" with qedr_free_pbl() when error
occurs to fix the memory leak. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: aspeed-vhub: Fix refcount leak bug in ast_vhub_init_desc()
We should call of_node_put() for the reference returned by
of_get_child_by_name() which has increased the refcount. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
memstick/ms_block: Fix a memory leak
'erased_blocks_bitmap' is never freed. As it is allocated at the same time
as 'used_blocks_bitmap', it is likely that it should be freed also at the
same time.
Add the corresponding bitmap_free() in msb_data_clear(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mmc: sdhci-of-esdhc: Fix refcount leak in esdhc_signal_voltage_switch
of_find_matching_node() returns a node pointer with refcount
incremented, we should use of_node_put() on it when not need anymore.
Add missing of_node_put() to avoid refcount leak.
of_node_put() checks null pointer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm thin: fix use-after-free crash in dm_sm_register_threshold_callback
Fault inject on pool metadata device reports:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dm_pool_register_metadata_threshold+0x40/0x80
Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881b9d50068 by task dmsetup/950
CPU: 7 PID: 950 Comm: dmsetup Tainted: G W 5.19.0-rc6 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1.fc33 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x34/0x44
print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0xeb/0x3f4
kasan_report.cold+0xe6/0x147
dm_pool_register_metadata_threshold+0x40/0x80
pool_ctr+0xa0a/0x1150
dm_table_add_target+0x2c8/0x640
table_load+0x1fd/0x430
ctl_ioctl+0x2c4/0x5a0
dm_ctl_ioctl+0xa/0x10
__x64_sys_ioctl+0xb3/0xd0
do_syscall_64+0x35/0x80
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x46/0xb0
This can be easily reproduced using:
echo offline > /sys/block/sda/device/state
dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/mapper/thin bs=4k count=10
dmsetup load pool --table "0 20971520 thin-pool /dev/sda /dev/sdb 128 0 0"
If a metadata commit fails, the transaction will be aborted and the
metadata space maps will be destroyed. If a DM table reload then
happens for this failed thin-pool, a use-after-free will occur in
dm_sm_register_threshold_callback (called from
dm_pool_register_metadata_threshold).
Fix this by in dm_pool_register_metadata_threshold() by returning the
-EINVAL error if the thin-pool is in fail mode. Also fail pool_ctr()
with a new error message: "Error registering metadata threshold". |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
posix-cpu-timers: Cleanup CPU timers before freeing them during exec
Commit 55e8c8eb2c7b ("posix-cpu-timers: Store a reference to a pid not a
task") started looking up tasks by PID when deleting a CPU timer.
When a non-leader thread calls execve, it will switch PIDs with the leader
process. Then, as it calls exit_itimers, posix_cpu_timer_del cannot find
the task because the timer still points out to the old PID.
That means that armed timers won't be disarmed, that is, they won't be
removed from the timerqueue_list. exit_itimers will still release their
memory, and when that list is later processed, it leads to a
use-after-free.
Clean up the timers from the de-threaded task before freeing them. This
prevents a reported use-after-free. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spmi: trace: fix stack-out-of-bound access in SPMI tracing functions
trace_spmi_write_begin() and trace_spmi_read_end() both call
memcpy() with a length of "len + 1". This leads to one extra
byte being read beyond the end of the specified buffer. Fix
this out-of-bound memory access by using a length of "len"
instead.
Here is a KASAN log showing the issue:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in trace_event_raw_event_spmi_read_end+0x1d0/0x234
Read of size 2 at addr ffffffc0265b7540 by task thermal@2.0-ser/1314
...
Call trace:
dump_backtrace+0x0/0x3e8
show_stack+0x2c/0x3c
dump_stack_lvl+0xdc/0x11c
print_address_description+0x74/0x384
kasan_report+0x188/0x268
kasan_check_range+0x270/0x2b0
memcpy+0x90/0xe8
trace_event_raw_event_spmi_read_end+0x1d0/0x234
spmi_read_cmd+0x294/0x3ac
spmi_ext_register_readl+0x84/0x9c
regmap_spmi_ext_read+0x144/0x1b0 [regmap_spmi]
_regmap_raw_read+0x40c/0x754
regmap_raw_read+0x3a0/0x514
regmap_bulk_read+0x418/0x494
adc5_gen3_poll_wait_hs+0xe8/0x1e0 [qcom_spmi_adc5_gen3]
...
__arm64_sys_read+0x4c/0x60
invoke_syscall+0x80/0x218
el0_svc_common+0xec/0x1c8
...
addr ffffffc0265b7540 is located in stack of task thermal@2.0-ser/1314 at offset 32 in frame:
adc5_gen3_poll_wait_hs+0x0/0x1e0 [qcom_spmi_adc5_gen3]
this frame has 1 object:
[32, 33) 'status'
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffffffc0265b7400: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1
ffffffc0265b7480: 04 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>ffffffc0265b7500: 00 00 00 00 f1 f1 f1 f1 01 f3 f3 f3 00 00 00 00
^
ffffffc0265b7580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
ffffffc0265b7600: f1 f1 f1 f1 01 f2 07 f2 f2 f2 01 f3 00 00 00 00
================================================================== |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/vt-d: avoid invalid memory access via node_online(NUMA_NO_NODE)
KASAN reports:
[ 4.668325][ T0] BUG: KASAN: wild-memory-access in dmar_parse_one_rhsa (arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:214 arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:226 include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:142 include/linux/nodemask.h:415 drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c:497)
[ 4.676149][ T0] Read of size 8 at addr 1fffffff85115558 by task swapper/0/0
[ 4.683454][ T0]
[ 4.685638][ T0] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc3-00004-g0e862838f290 #1
[ 4.694331][ T0] Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-5018D-FN4T/X10SDV-8C-TLN4F, BIOS 1.1 03/02/2016
[ 4.703196][ T0] Call Trace:
[ 4.706334][ T0] <TASK>
[ 4.709133][ T0] ? dmar_parse_one_rhsa (arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:214 arch/x86/include/asm/bitops.h:226 include/asm-generic/bitops/instrumented-non-atomic.h:142 include/linux/nodemask.h:415 drivers/iommu/intel/dmar.c:497)
after converting the type of the first argument (@nr, bit number)
of arch_test_bit() from `long` to `unsigned long`[0].
Under certain conditions (for example, when ACPI NUMA is disabled
via command line), pxm_to_node() can return %NUMA_NO_NODE (-1).
It is valid 'magic' number of NUMA node, but not valid bit number
to use in bitops.
node_online() eventually descends to test_bit() without checking
for the input, assuming it's on caller side (which might be good
for perf-critical tasks). There, -1 becomes %ULONG_MAX which leads
to an insane array index when calculating bit position in memory.
For now, add an explicit check for @node being not %NUMA_NO_NODE
before calling test_bit(). The actual logics didn't change here
at all.
[0] https://github.com/norov/linux/commit/0e862838f290147ea9c16db852d8d494b552d38d |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tee: add overflow check in register_shm_helper()
With special lengths supplied by user space, register_shm_helper() has
an integer overflow when calculating the number of pages covered by a
supplied user space memory region.
This causes internal_get_user_pages_fast() a helper function of
pin_user_pages_fast() to do a NULL pointer dereference:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000010
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 173 Comm: optee_example_a Not tainted 5.19.0 #11
Hardware name: QEMU QEMU Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
pc : internal_get_user_pages_fast+0x474/0xa80
Call trace:
internal_get_user_pages_fast+0x474/0xa80
pin_user_pages_fast+0x24/0x4c
register_shm_helper+0x194/0x330
tee_shm_register_user_buf+0x78/0x120
tee_ioctl+0xd0/0x11a0
__arm64_sys_ioctl+0xa8/0xec
invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114
Fix this by adding an an explicit call to access_ok() in
tee_shm_register_user_buf() to catch an invalid user space address
early. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm raid: fix address sanitizer warning in raid_resume
There is a KASAN warning in raid_resume when running the lvm test
lvconvert-raid.sh. The reason for the warning is that mddev->raid_disks
is greater than rs->raid_disks, so the loop touches one entry beyond
the allocated length. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: arm_scpi: Ensure scpi_info is not assigned if the probe fails
When scpi probe fails, at any point, we need to ensure that the scpi_info
is not set and will remain NULL until the probe succeeds. If it is not
taken care, then it could result use-after-free as the value is exported
via get_scpi_ops() and could refer to a memory allocated via devm_kzalloc()
but freed when the probe fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/reclaim: fix potential memory leak in damon_reclaim_init()
damon_reclaim_init() allocates a memory chunk for ctx with
damon_new_ctx(). When damon_select_ops() fails, ctx is not released,
which will lead to a memory leak.
We should release the ctx with damon_destroy_ctx() when damon_select_ops()
fails to fix the memory leak. |
