| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: rely on mac80211 debugfs handling for vif
mac80211 started to delete debugfs entries in certain cases, causing a
ath11k to crash when it tried to delete the entries later. Fix this by
relying on mac80211 to delete the entries when appropriate and adding
them from the vif_add_debugfs handler. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
llc: make llc_ui_sendmsg() more robust against bonding changes
syzbot was able to trick llc_ui_sendmsg(), allocating an skb with no
headroom, but subsequently trying to push 14 bytes of Ethernet header [1]
Like some others, llc_ui_sendmsg() releases the socket lock before
calling sock_alloc_send_skb().
Then it acquires it again, but does not redo all the sanity checks
that were performed.
This fix:
- Uses LL_RESERVED_SPACE() to reserve space.
- Check all conditions again after socket lock is held again.
- Do not account Ethernet header for mtu limitation.
[1]
skbuff: skb_under_panic: text:ffff800088baa334 len:1514 put:14 head:ffff0000c9c37000 data:ffff0000c9c36ff2 tail:0x5dc end:0x6c0 dev:bond0
kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:193 !
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 6875 Comm: syz-executor.0 Not tainted 6.7.0-rc8-syzkaller-00101-g0802e17d9aca-dirty #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/17/2023
pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline]
pc : skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203
lr : skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline]
lr : skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203
sp : ffff800096f97000
x29: ffff800096f97010 x28: ffff80008cc8d668 x27: dfff800000000000
x26: ffff0000cb970c90 x25: 00000000000005dc x24: ffff0000c9c36ff2
x23: ffff0000c9c37000 x22: 00000000000005ea x21: 00000000000006c0
x20: 000000000000000e x19: ffff800088baa334 x18: 1fffe000368261ce
x17: ffff80008e4ed000 x16: ffff80008a8310f8 x15: 0000000000000001
x14: 1ffff00012df2d58 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000ff0100 x9 : e28a51f1087e8400
x8 : e28a51f1087e8400 x7 : ffff80008028f8d0 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : 0000000000000001 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : ffff800082b78714
x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000100000000 x0 : 0000000000000089
Call trace:
skb_panic net/core/skbuff.c:189 [inline]
skb_under_panic+0x13c/0x140 net/core/skbuff.c:203
skb_push+0xf0/0x108 net/core/skbuff.c:2451
eth_header+0x44/0x1f8 net/ethernet/eth.c:83
dev_hard_header include/linux/netdevice.h:3188 [inline]
llc_mac_hdr_init+0x110/0x17c net/llc/llc_output.c:33
llc_sap_action_send_xid_c+0x170/0x344 net/llc/llc_s_ac.c:85
llc_exec_sap_trans_actions net/llc/llc_sap.c:153 [inline]
llc_sap_next_state net/llc/llc_sap.c:182 [inline]
llc_sap_state_process+0x1ec/0x774 net/llc/llc_sap.c:209
llc_build_and_send_xid_pkt+0x12c/0x1c0 net/llc/llc_sap.c:270
llc_ui_sendmsg+0x7bc/0xb1c net/llc/af_llc.c:997
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline]
sock_sendmsg+0x194/0x274 net/socket.c:767
splice_to_socket+0x7cc/0xd58 fs/splice.c:881
do_splice_from fs/splice.c:933 [inline]
direct_splice_actor+0xe4/0x1c0 fs/splice.c:1142
splice_direct_to_actor+0x2a0/0x7e4 fs/splice.c:1088
do_splice_direct+0x20c/0x348 fs/splice.c:1194
do_sendfile+0x4bc/0xc70 fs/read_write.c:1254
__do_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1322 [inline]
__se_sys_sendfile64 fs/read_write.c:1308 [inline]
__arm64_sys_sendfile64+0x160/0x3b4 fs/read_write.c:1308
__invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:37 [inline]
invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:51
el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:136
do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:155
el0_svc+0x54/0x158 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:678
el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:696
el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:595
Code: aa1803e6 aa1903e7 a90023f5 94792f6a (d4210000) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: core: Move scsi_host_busy() out of host lock for waking up EH handler
Inside scsi_eh_wakeup(), scsi_host_busy() is called & checked with host
lock every time for deciding if error handler kthread needs to be waken up.
This can be too heavy in case of recovery, such as:
- N hardware queues
- queue depth is M for each hardware queue
- each scsi_host_busy() iterates over (N * M) tag/requests
If recovery is triggered in case that all requests are in-flight, each
scsi_eh_wakeup() is strictly serialized, when scsi_eh_wakeup() is called
for the last in-flight request, scsi_host_busy() has been run for (N * M -
1) times, and request has been iterated for (N*M - 1) * (N * M) times.
If both N and M are big enough, hard lockup can be triggered on acquiring
host lock, and it is observed on mpi3mr(128 hw queues, queue depth 8169).
Fix the issue by calling scsi_host_busy() outside the host lock. We don't
need the host lock for getting busy count because host the lock never
covers that.
[mkp: Drop unnecessary 'busy' variables pointed out by Bart] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: huge_memory: don't force huge page alignment on 32 bit
commit efa7df3e3bb5 ("mm: align larger anonymous mappings on THP
boundaries") caused two issues [1] [2] reported on 32 bit system or compat
userspace.
It doesn't make too much sense to force huge page alignment on 32 bit
system due to the constrained virtual address space.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/d0a136a0-4a31-46bc-adf4-2db109a61672@kernel.org/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CAJuCfpHXLdQy1a2B6xN2d7quTYwg2OoZseYPZTRpU0eHHKD-sQ@mail.gmail.com/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/membarrier: reduce the ability to hammer on sys_membarrier
On some systems, sys_membarrier can be very expensive, causing overall
slowdowns for everything. So put a lock on the path in order to
serialize the accesses to prevent the ability for this to be called at
too high of a frequency and saturate the machine. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: regenerate buddy after block freeing failed if under fc replay
This mostly reverts commit 6bd97bf273bd ("ext4: remove redundant
mb_regenerate_buddy()") and reintroduces mb_regenerate_buddy(). Based on
code in mb_free_blocks(), fast commit replay can end up marking as free
blocks that are already marked as such. This causes corruption of the
buddy bitmap so we need to regenerate it in that case. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: Sync efi page table's kernel mappings before switching
The EFI page table is initially created as a copy of the kernel page table.
With VMAP_STACK enabled, kernel stacks are allocated in the vmalloc area:
if the stack is allocated in a new PGD (one that was not present at the
moment of the efi page table creation or not synced in a previous vmalloc
fault), the kernel will take a trap when switching to the efi page table
when the vmalloc kernel stack is accessed, resulting in a kernel panic.
Fix that by updating the efi kernel mappings before switching to the efi
page table. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
char: tpm: Protect tpm_pm_suspend with locks
Currently tpm transactions are executed unconditionally in
tpm_pm_suspend() function, which may lead to races with other tpm
accessors in the system.
Specifically, the hw_random tpm driver makes use of tpm_get_random(),
and this function is called in a loop from a kthread, which means it's
not frozen alongside userspace, and so can race with the work done
during system suspend:
tpm tpm0: tpm_transmit: tpm_recv: error -52
tpm tpm0: invalid TPM_STS.x 0xff, dumping stack for forensics
CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 6.1.0-rc5+ #135
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.0-20220807_005459-localhost 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
tpm_tis_status.cold+0x19/0x20
tpm_transmit+0x13b/0x390
tpm_transmit_cmd+0x20/0x80
tpm1_pm_suspend+0xa6/0x110
tpm_pm_suspend+0x53/0x80
__pnp_bus_suspend+0x35/0xe0
__device_suspend+0x10f/0x350
Fix this by calling tpm_try_get_ops(), which itself is a wrapper around
tpm_chip_start(), but takes the appropriate mutex.
[Jason: reworked commit message, added metadata] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/damon/sysfs: fix wrong empty schemes assumption under online tuning in damon_sysfs_set_schemes()
Commit da87878010e5 ("mm/damon/sysfs: support online inputs update") made
'damon_sysfs_set_schemes()' to be called for running DAMON context, which
could have schemes. In the case, DAMON sysfs interface is supposed to
update, remove, or add schemes to reflect the sysfs files. However, the
code is assuming the DAMON context wouldn't have schemes at all, and
therefore creates and adds new schemes. As a result, the code doesn't
work as intended for online schemes tuning and could have more than
expected memory footprint. The schemes are all in the DAMON context, so
it doesn't leak the memory, though.
Remove the wrong asssumption (the DAMON context wouldn't have schemes) in
'damon_sysfs_set_schemes()' to fix the bug. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mana: Fix race on per-CQ variable napi work_done
After calling napi_complete_done(), the NAPIF_STATE_SCHED bit may be
cleared, and another CPU can start napi thread and access per-CQ variable,
cq->work_done. If the other thread (for example, from busy_poll) sets
it to a value >= budget, this thread will continue to run when it should
stop, and cause memory corruption and panic.
To fix this issue, save the per-CQ work_done variable in a local variable
before napi_complete_done(), so it won't be corrupted by a possible
concurrent thread after napi_complete_done().
Also, add a flag bit to advertise to the NIC firmware: the NAPI work_done
variable race is fixed, so the driver is able to reliably support features
like busy_poll. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: conntrack: fix using __this_cpu_add in preemptible
Currently in nf_conntrack_hash_check_insert(), when it fails in
nf_ct_ext_valid_pre/post(), NF_CT_STAT_INC() will be called in the
preemptible context, a call trace can be triggered:
BUG: using __this_cpu_add() in preemptible [00000000] code: conntrack/1636
caller is nf_conntrack_hash_check_insert+0x45/0x430 [nf_conntrack]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x33/0x46
check_preemption_disabled+0xc3/0xf0
nf_conntrack_hash_check_insert+0x45/0x430 [nf_conntrack]
ctnetlink_create_conntrack+0x3cd/0x4e0 [nf_conntrack_netlink]
ctnetlink_new_conntrack+0x1c0/0x450 [nf_conntrack_netlink]
nfnetlink_rcv_msg+0x277/0x2f0 [nfnetlink]
netlink_rcv_skb+0x50/0x100
nfnetlink_rcv+0x65/0x144 [nfnetlink]
netlink_unicast+0x1ae/0x290
netlink_sendmsg+0x257/0x4f0
sock_sendmsg+0x5f/0x70
This patch is to fix it by changing to use NF_CT_STAT_INC_ATOMIC() for
nf_ct_ext_valid_pre/post() check in nf_conntrack_hash_check_insert(),
as well as nf_ct_ext_valid_post() in __nf_conntrack_confirm().
Note that nf_ct_ext_valid_pre() check in __nf_conntrack_confirm() is
safe to use NF_CT_STAT_INC(), as it's under local_bh_disable(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: Fix not cleanup led when bt_init fails
bt_init() calls bt_leds_init() to register led, but if it fails later,
bt_leds_cleanup() is not called to unregister it.
This can cause panic if the argument "bluetooth-power" in text is freed
and then another led_trigger_register() tries to access it:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffc06d3bc0
RIP: 0010:strcmp+0xc/0x30
Call Trace:
<TASK>
led_trigger_register+0x10d/0x4f0
led_trigger_register_simple+0x7d/0x100
bt_init+0x39/0xf7 [bluetooth]
do_one_initcall+0xd0/0x4e0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: rndis: add spinlock for rndis response list
There's no lock for rndis response list. It could cause list corruption
if there're two different list_add at the same time like below.
It's better to add in rndis_add_response / rndis_free_response
/ rndis_get_next_response to prevent any race condition on response list.
[ 361.894299] [1: irq/191-dwc3:16979] list_add corruption.
next->prev should be prev (ffffff80651764d0),
but was ffffff883dc36f80. (next=ffffff80651764d0).
[ 361.904380] [1: irq/191-dwc3:16979] Call trace:
[ 361.904391] [1: irq/191-dwc3:16979] __list_add_valid+0x74/0x90
[ 361.904401] [1: irq/191-dwc3:16979] rndis_msg_parser+0x168/0x8c0
[ 361.904409] [1: irq/191-dwc3:16979] rndis_command_complete+0x24/0x84
[ 361.904417] [1: irq/191-dwc3:16979] usb_gadget_giveback_request+0x20/0xe4
[ 361.904426] [1: irq/191-dwc3:16979] dwc3_gadget_giveback+0x44/0x60
[ 361.904434] [1: irq/191-dwc3:16979] dwc3_ep0_complete_data+0x1e8/0x3a0
[ 361.904442] [1: irq/191-dwc3:16979] dwc3_ep0_interrupt+0x29c/0x3dc
[ 361.904450] [1: irq/191-dwc3:16979] dwc3_process_event_entry+0x78/0x6cc
[ 361.904457] [1: irq/191-dwc3:16979] dwc3_process_event_buf+0xa0/0x1ec
[ 361.904465] [1: irq/191-dwc3:16979] dwc3_thread_interrupt+0x34/0x5c |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ipv6: ensure we call ipv6_mc_down() at most once
There are two reasons for addrconf_notify() to be called with NETDEV_DOWN:
either the network device is actually going down, or IPv6 was disabled
on the interface.
If either of them stays down while the other is toggled, we repeatedly
call the code for NETDEV_DOWN, including ipv6_mc_down(), while never
calling the corresponding ipv6_mc_up() in between. This will cause a
new entry in idev->mc_tomb to be allocated for each multicast group
the interface is subscribed to, which in turn leaks one struct ifmcaddr6
per nontrivial multicast group the interface is subscribed to.
The following reproducer will leak at least $n objects:
ip addr add ff2e::4242/32 dev eth0 autojoin
sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.eth0.disable_ipv6=1
for i in $(seq 1 $n); do
ip link set up eth0; ip link set down eth0
done
Joining groups with IPV6_ADD_MEMBERSHIP (unprivileged) or setting the
sysctl net.ipv6.conf.eth0.forwarding to 1 (=> subscribing to ff02::2)
can also be used to create a nontrivial idev->mc_list, which will the
leak objects with the right up-down-sequence.
Based on both sources for NETDEV_DOWN events the interface IPv6 state
should be considered:
- not ready if the network interface is not ready OR IPv6 is disabled
for it
- ready if the network interface is ready AND IPv6 is enabled for it
The functions ipv6_mc_up() and ipv6_down() should only be run when this
state changes.
Implement this by remembering when the IPv6 state is ready, and only
run ipv6_mc_down() if it actually changed from ready to not ready.
The other direction (not ready -> ready) already works correctly, as:
- the interface notification triggered codepath for NETDEV_UP /
NETDEV_CHANGE returns early if ipv6 is disabled, and
- the disable_ipv6=0 triggered codepath skips fully initializing the
interface as long as addrconf_link_ready(dev) returns false
- calling ipv6_mc_up() repeatedly does not leak anything |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: fix relocation crash due to premature return from btrfs_commit_transaction()
We are seeing crashes similar to the following trace:
[38.969182] WARNING: CPU: 20 PID: 2105 at fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4070 btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x2dc/0x340 [btrfs]
[38.973556] CPU: 20 PID: 2105 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 5.17.0-rc4 #54
[38.974580] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[38.976539] RIP: 0010:btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x2dc/0x340 [btrfs]
[38.980336] RSP: 0000:ffffb0dd42e03c20 EFLAGS: 00010206
[38.981218] RAX: ffff96cfc4ede800 RBX: ffff96cfc3ce0000 RCX: 000000000002ca14
[38.982560] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 4cfd109a0bcb5d7f RDI: ffff96cfc3ce0360
[38.983619] RBP: ffff96cfc309c000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[38.984678] R10: ffff96cec0000001 R11: ffffe84c80000000 R12: ffff96cfc4ede800
[38.985735] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff96cfc3ce0360
[38.987146] FS: 00007f11c15218c0(0000) GS:ffff96d6dfb00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[38.988662] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[38.989398] CR2: 00007ffc922c8e60 CR3: 00000001147a6001 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
[38.990279] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[38.991219] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[38.992528] Call Trace:
[38.992854] <TASK>
[38.993148] btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x27/0xe0 [btrfs]
[38.993941] btrfs_balance+0x78e/0xea0 [btrfs]
[38.994801] ? vsnprintf+0x33c/0x520
[38.995368] ? __kmalloc_track_caller+0x351/0x440
[38.996198] btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x2b9/0x3a0 [btrfs]
[38.997084] btrfs_ioctl+0x11b0/0x2da0 [btrfs]
[38.997867] ? mod_objcg_state+0xee/0x340
[38.998552] ? seq_release+0x24/0x30
[38.999184] ? proc_nr_files+0x30/0x30
[38.999654] ? call_rcu+0xc8/0x2f0
[39.000228] ? __x64_sys_ioctl+0x84/0xc0
[39.000872] ? btrfs_ioctl_get_supported_features+0x30/0x30 [btrfs]
[39.001973] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x84/0xc0
[39.002566] do_syscall_64+0x3a/0x80
[39.003011] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
[39.003735] RIP: 0033:0x7f11c166959b
[39.007324] RSP: 002b:00007fff2543e998 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
[39.008521] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f11c1521698 RCX: 00007f11c166959b
[39.009833] RDX: 00007fff2543ea40 RSI: 00000000c4009420 RDI: 0000000000000003
[39.011270] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000013 R09: 00007f11c16f94e0
[39.012581] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff25440df3
[39.014046] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fff2543ea40 R15: 0000000000000001
[39.015040] </TASK>
[39.015418] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[43.131559] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[43.132234] kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c:2717!
[43.133031] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
[43.133702] CPU: 1 PID: 1839 Comm: btrfs Tainted: G W 5.17.0-rc4 #54
[43.134863] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.12.0-59-gc9ba5276e321-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[43.136426] RIP: 0010:unpin_extent_range+0x37a/0x4f0 [btrfs]
[43.139913] RSP: 0000:ffffb0dd4216bc70 EFLAGS: 00010246
[43.140629] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff96cfc34490f8 RCX: 0000000000000001
[43.141604] RDX: 0000000080000001 RSI: 0000000051d00000 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
[43.142645] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff96cfd07dca50
[43.143669] R10: ffff96cfc46e8a00 R11: fffffffffffec000 R12: 0000000041d00000
[43.144657] R13: ffff96cfc3ce0000 R14: ffffb0dd4216bd08 R15: 0000000000000000
[43.145686] FS: 00007f7657dd68c0(0000) GS:ffff96d6df640000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[43.146808] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[43.147584] CR2: 00007f7fe81bf5b0 CR3: 00000001093ee004 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
[43.148589] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[43.149581] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 00000000000
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64/mm: fix incorrect file_map_count for invalid pmd
The page table check trigger BUG_ON() unexpectedly when split hugepage:
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at mm/page_table_check.c:119!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP
Dumping ftrace buffer:
(ftrace buffer empty)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 7 PID: 210 Comm: transhuge-stres Not tainted 6.1.0-rc3+ #748
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 20000005 (nzCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : page_table_check_set.isra.0+0x398/0x468
lr : page_table_check_set.isra.0+0x1c0/0x468
[...]
Call trace:
page_table_check_set.isra.0+0x398/0x468
__page_table_check_pte_set+0x160/0x1c0
__split_huge_pmd_locked+0x900/0x1648
__split_huge_pmd+0x28c/0x3b8
unmap_page_range+0x428/0x858
unmap_single_vma+0xf4/0x1c8
zap_page_range+0x2b0/0x410
madvise_vma_behavior+0xc44/0xe78
do_madvise+0x280/0x698
__arm64_sys_madvise+0x90/0xe8
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0xdc/0x1d8
do_el0_svc+0xf4/0x3f8
el0_svc+0x58/0x120
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xb8/0xc0
el0t_64_sync+0x19c/0x1a0
[...]
On arm64, pmd_leaf() will return true even if the pmd is invalid due to
pmd_present_invalid() check. So in pmdp_invalidate() the file_map_count
will not only decrease once but also increase once. Then in set_pte_at(),
the file_map_count increase again, and so trigger BUG_ON() unexpectedly.
Add !pmd_present_invalid() check in pmd_user_accessible_page() to fix the
problem. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vmwgfx: Remove rcu locks from user resources
User resource lookups used rcu to avoid two extra atomics. Unfortunately
the rcu paths were buggy and it was easy to make the driver crash by
submitting command buffers from two different threads. Because the
lookups never show up in performance profiles replace them with a
regular spin lock which fixes the races in accesses to those shared
resources.
Fixes kernel oops'es in IGT's vmwgfx execution_buffer stress test and
seen crashes with apps using shared resources. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing/osnoise: Do not unregister events twice
Nicolas reported that using:
# trace-cmd record -e all -M 10 -p osnoise --poll
Resulted in the following kernel warning:
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1217 at kernel/tracepoint.c:404 tracepoint_probe_unregister+0x280/0x370
[...]
CPU: 0 PID: 1217 Comm: trace-cmd Not tainted 5.17.0-rc6-next-20220307-nico+ #19
RIP: 0010:tracepoint_probe_unregister+0x280/0x370
[...]
CR2: 00007ff919b29497 CR3: 0000000109da4005 CR4: 0000000000170ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
osnoise_workload_stop+0x36/0x90
tracing_set_tracer+0x108/0x260
tracing_set_trace_write+0x94/0xd0
? __check_object_size.part.0+0x10a/0x150
? selinux_file_permission+0x104/0x150
vfs_write+0xb5/0x290
ksys_write+0x5f/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x3b/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
RIP: 0033:0x7ff919a18127
[...]
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
The warning complains about an attempt to unregister an
unregistered tracepoint.
This happens on trace-cmd because it first stops tracing, and
then switches the tracer to nop. Which is equivalent to:
# cd /sys/kernel/tracing/
# echo osnoise > current_tracer
# echo 0 > tracing_on
# echo nop > current_tracer
The osnoise tracer stops the workload when no trace instance
is actually collecting data. This can be caused both by
disabling tracing or disabling the tracer itself.
To avoid unregistering events twice, use the existing
trace_osnoise_callback_enabled variable to check if the events
(and the workload) are actually active before trying to
deactivate them. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: fix panic when DSA master device unbinds on shutdown
Rafael reports that on a system with LX2160A and Marvell DSA switches,
if a reboot occurs while the DSA master (dpaa2-eth) is up, the following
panic can be seen:
systemd-shutdown[1]: Rebooting.
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 00a0000800000041
[00a0000800000041] address between user and kernel address ranges
Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
CPU: 6 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Not tainted 5.16.5-00042-g8f5585009b24 #32
pc : dsa_slave_netdevice_event+0x130/0x3e4
lr : raw_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x6c
Call trace:
dsa_slave_netdevice_event+0x130/0x3e4
raw_notifier_call_chain+0x50/0x6c
call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0x54/0xa0
__dev_close_many+0x50/0x130
dev_close_many+0x84/0x120
unregister_netdevice_many+0x130/0x710
unregister_netdevice_queue+0x8c/0xd0
unregister_netdev+0x20/0x30
dpaa2_eth_remove+0x68/0x190
fsl_mc_driver_remove+0x20/0x5c
__device_release_driver+0x21c/0x220
device_release_driver_internal+0xac/0xb0
device_links_unbind_consumers+0xd4/0x100
__device_release_driver+0x94/0x220
device_release_driver+0x28/0x40
bus_remove_device+0x118/0x124
device_del+0x174/0x420
fsl_mc_device_remove+0x24/0x40
__fsl_mc_device_remove+0xc/0x20
device_for_each_child+0x58/0xa0
dprc_remove+0x90/0xb0
fsl_mc_driver_remove+0x20/0x5c
__device_release_driver+0x21c/0x220
device_release_driver+0x28/0x40
bus_remove_device+0x118/0x124
device_del+0x174/0x420
fsl_mc_bus_remove+0x80/0x100
fsl_mc_bus_shutdown+0xc/0x1c
platform_shutdown+0x20/0x30
device_shutdown+0x154/0x330
__do_sys_reboot+0x1cc/0x250
__arm64_sys_reboot+0x20/0x30
invoke_syscall.constprop.0+0x4c/0xe0
do_el0_svc+0x4c/0x150
el0_svc+0x24/0xb0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa8/0xb0
el0t_64_sync+0x178/0x17c
It can be seen from the stack trace that the problem is that the
deregistration of the master causes a dev_close(), which gets notified
as NETDEV_GOING_DOWN to dsa_slave_netdevice_event().
But dsa_switch_shutdown() has already run, and this has unregistered the
DSA slave interfaces, and yet, the NETDEV_GOING_DOWN handler attempts to
call dev_close_many() on those slave interfaces, leading to the problem.
The previous attempt to avoid the NETDEV_GOING_DOWN on the master after
dsa_switch_shutdown() was called seems improper. Unregistering the slave
interfaces is unnecessary and unhelpful. Instead, after the slaves have
stopped being uppers of the DSA master, we can now reset to NULL the
master->dsa_ptr pointer, which will make DSA start ignoring all future
notifier events on the master. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc64/bpf: Limit 'ldbrx' to processors compliant with ISA v2.06
Johan reported the below crash with test_bpf on ppc64 e5500:
test_bpf: #296 ALU_END_FROM_LE 64: 0x0123456789abcdef -> 0x67452301 jited:1
Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 4 [#1]
BE PAGE_SIZE=4K SMP NR_CPUS=24 QEMU e500
Modules linked in: test_bpf(+)
CPU: 0 PID: 76 Comm: insmod Not tainted 5.14.0-03771-g98c2059e008a-dirty #1
NIP: 8000000000061c3c LR: 80000000006dea64 CTR: 8000000000061c18
REGS: c0000000032d3420 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (5.14.0-03771-g98c2059e008a-dirty)
MSR: 0000000080089000 <EE,ME> CR: 88002822 XER: 20000000 IRQMASK: 0
<...>
NIP [8000000000061c3c] 0x8000000000061c3c
LR [80000000006dea64] .__run_one+0x104/0x17c [test_bpf]
Call Trace:
.__run_one+0x60/0x17c [test_bpf] (unreliable)
.test_bpf_init+0x6a8/0xdc8 [test_bpf]
.do_one_initcall+0x6c/0x28c
.do_init_module+0x68/0x28c
.load_module+0x2460/0x2abc
.__do_sys_init_module+0x120/0x18c
.system_call_exception+0x110/0x1b8
system_call_common+0xf0/0x210
--- interrupt: c00 at 0x101d0acc
<...>
---[ end trace 47b2bf19090bb3d0 ]---
Illegal instruction
The illegal instruction turned out to be 'ldbrx' emitted for
BPF_FROM_[L|B]E, which was only introduced in ISA v2.06. Guard use of
the same and implement an alternative approach for older processors. |
