| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/userfaultfd: fix kmap_local LIFO ordering for CONFIG_HIGHPTE
With CONFIG_HIGHPTE on 32-bit ARM, move_pages_pte() maps PTE pages using
kmap_local_page(), which requires unmapping in Last-In-First-Out order.
The current code maps dst_pte first, then src_pte, but unmaps them in the
same order (dst_pte, src_pte), violating the LIFO requirement. This
causes the warning in kunmap_local_indexed():
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 604 at mm/highmem.c:622 kunmap_local_indexed+0x178/0x17c
addr \!= __fix_to_virt(FIX_KMAP_BEGIN + idx)
Fix this by reversing the unmap order to respect LIFO ordering.
This issue follows the same pattern as similar fixes:
- commit eca6828403b8 ("crypto: skcipher - fix mismatch between mapping and unmapping order")
- commit 8cf57c6df818 ("nilfs2: eliminate staggered calls to kunmap in nilfs_rename")
Both of which addressed the same fundamental requirement that kmap_local
operations must follow LIFO ordering. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Tell memcg to use allow_spinning=false path in bpf_timer_init()
Currently, calling bpf_map_kmalloc_node() from __bpf_async_init() can
cause various locking issues; see the following stack trace (edited for
style) as one example:
...
[10.011566] do_raw_spin_lock.cold
[10.011570] try_to_wake_up (5) double-acquiring the same
[10.011575] kick_pool rq_lock, causing a hardlockup
[10.011579] __queue_work
[10.011582] queue_work_on
[10.011585] kernfs_notify
[10.011589] cgroup_file_notify
[10.011593] try_charge_memcg (4) memcg accounting raises an
[10.011597] obj_cgroup_charge_pages MEMCG_MAX event
[10.011599] obj_cgroup_charge_account
[10.011600] __memcg_slab_post_alloc_hook
[10.011603] __kmalloc_node_noprof
...
[10.011611] bpf_map_kmalloc_node
[10.011612] __bpf_async_init
[10.011615] bpf_timer_init (3) BPF calls bpf_timer_init()
[10.011617] bpf_prog_xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx_fcg_runnable
[10.011619] bpf__sched_ext_ops_runnable
[10.011620] enqueue_task_scx (2) BPF runs with rq_lock held
[10.011622] enqueue_task
[10.011626] ttwu_do_activate
[10.011629] sched_ttwu_pending (1) grabs rq_lock
...
The above was reproduced on bpf-next (b338cf849ec8) by modifying
./tools/sched_ext/scx_flatcg.bpf.c to call bpf_timer_init() during
ops.runnable(), and hacking the memcg accounting code a bit to make
a bpf_timer_init() call more likely to raise an MEMCG_MAX event.
We have also run into other similar variants (both internally and on
bpf-next), including double-acquiring cgroup_file_kn_lock, the same
worker_pool::lock, etc.
As suggested by Shakeel, fix this by using __GFP_HIGH instead of
GFP_ATOMIC in __bpf_async_init(), so that e.g. if try_charge_memcg()
raises an MEMCG_MAX event, we call __memcg_memory_event() with
@allow_spinning=false and avoid calling cgroup_file_notify() there.
Depends on mm patch
"memcg: skip cgroup_file_notify if spinning is not allowed":
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250905201606.66198-1-shakeel.butt@linux.dev/
v0 approach s/bpf_map_kmalloc_node/bpf_mem_alloc/
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250905061919.439648-1-yepeilin@google.com/
v1 approach:
https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250905234547.862249-1-yepeilin@google.com/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
macsec: sync features on RTM_NEWLINK
Syzkaller managed to lock the lower device via ETHTOOL_SFEATURES:
netdev_lock include/linux/netdevice.h:2761 [inline]
netdev_lock_ops include/net/netdev_lock.h:42 [inline]
netdev_sync_lower_features net/core/dev.c:10649 [inline]
__netdev_update_features+0xcb1/0x1be0 net/core/dev.c:10819
netdev_update_features+0x6d/0xe0 net/core/dev.c:10876
macsec_notify+0x2f5/0x660 drivers/net/macsec.c:4533
notifier_call_chain+0x1b3/0x3e0 kernel/notifier.c:85
call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2267 [inline]
call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2281 [inline]
netdev_features_change+0x85/0xc0 net/core/dev.c:1570
__dev_ethtool net/ethtool/ioctl.c:3469 [inline]
dev_ethtool+0x1536/0x19b0 net/ethtool/ioctl.c:3502
dev_ioctl+0x392/0x1150 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:759
It happens because lower features are out of sync with the upper:
__dev_ethtool (real_dev)
netdev_lock_ops(real_dev)
ETHTOOL_SFEATURES
__netdev_features_change
netdev_sync_upper_features
disable LRO on the lower
if (old_features != dev->features)
netdev_features_change
fires NETDEV_FEAT_CHANGE
macsec_notify
NETDEV_FEAT_CHANGE
netdev_update_features (for each macsec dev)
netdev_sync_lower_features
if (upper_features != lower_features)
netdev_lock_ops(lower) # lower == real_dev
stuck
...
netdev_unlock_ops(real_dev)
Per commit af5f54b0ef9e ("net: Lock lower level devices when updating
features"), we elide the lock/unlock when the upper and lower features
are synced. Makes sure the lower (real_dev) has proper features after
the macsec link has been created. This makes sure we never hit the
situation where we need to sync upper flags to the lower. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
erofs: fix runtime warning on truncate_folio_batch_exceptionals()
Commit 0e2f80afcfa6("fs/dax: ensure all pages are idle prior to
filesystem unmount") introduced the WARN_ON_ONCE to capture whether
the filesystem has removed all DAX entries or not and applied the
fix to xfs and ext4.
Apply the missed fix on erofs to fix the runtime warning:
[ 5.266254] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 5.266274] WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 3109 at mm/truncate.c:89 truncate_folio_batch_exceptionals+0xff/0x260
[ 5.266294] Modules linked in:
[ 5.266999] CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 3109 Comm: umount Tainted: G S 6.16.0+ #6 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[ 5.267012] Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC
[ 5.267017] Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 5000/05WXFV, BIOS 1.5.1 08/24/2022
[ 5.267024] RIP: 0010:truncate_folio_batch_exceptionals+0xff/0x260
[ 5.267076] Code: 00 00 41 39 df 7f 11 eb 78 83 c3 01 49 83 c4 08 41 39 df 74 6c 48 63 f3 48 83 fe 1f 0f 83 3c 01 00 00 43 f6 44 26 08 01 74 df <0f> 0b 4a 8b 34 22 4c 89 ef 48 89 55 90 e8 ff 54 1f 00 48 8b 55 90
[ 5.267083] RSP: 0018:ffffc900013f36c8 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 5.267095] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 5.267101] RDX: ffffc900013f3790 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff8882a1407898
[ 5.267108] RBP: ffffc900013f3740 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 5.267113] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 5.267119] R13: ffff8882a1407ab8 R14: ffffc900013f3888 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 5.267125] FS: 00007aaa8b437800(0000) GS:ffff88850025b000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 5.267132] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 5.267138] CR2: 00007aaa8b3aac10 CR3: 000000024f764000 CR4: 0000000000f52ef0
[ 5.267144] PKRU: 55555554
[ 5.267150] Call Trace:
[ 5.267154] <TASK>
[ 5.267181] truncate_inode_pages_range+0x118/0x5e0
[ 5.267193] ? save_trace+0x54/0x390
[ 5.267296] truncate_inode_pages_final+0x43/0x60
[ 5.267309] evict+0x2a4/0x2c0
[ 5.267339] dispose_list+0x39/0x80
[ 5.267352] evict_inodes+0x150/0x1b0
[ 5.267376] generic_shutdown_super+0x41/0x180
[ 5.267390] kill_block_super+0x1b/0x50
[ 5.267402] erofs_kill_sb+0x81/0x90 [erofs]
[ 5.267436] deactivate_locked_super+0x32/0xb0
[ 5.267450] deactivate_super+0x46/0x60
[ 5.267460] cleanup_mnt+0xc3/0x170
[ 5.267475] __cleanup_mnt+0x12/0x20
[ 5.267485] task_work_run+0x5d/0xb0
[ 5.267499] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x144/0x170
[ 5.267512] do_syscall_64+0x2b9/0x7c0
[ 5.267523] ? __lock_acquire+0x665/0x2ce0
[ 5.267535] ? __lock_acquire+0x665/0x2ce0
[ 5.267560] ? lock_acquire+0xcd/0x300
[ 5.267573] ? find_held_lock+0x31/0x90
[ 5.267582] ? mntput_no_expire+0x97/0x4e0
[ 5.267606] ? mntput_no_expire+0xa1/0x4e0
[ 5.267625] ? mntput+0x24/0x50
[ 5.267634] ? path_put+0x1e/0x30
[ 5.267647] ? do_faccessat+0x120/0x2f0
[ 5.267677] ? do_syscall_64+0x1a2/0x7c0
[ 5.267686] ? from_kgid_munged+0x17/0x30
[ 5.267703] ? from_kuid_munged+0x13/0x30
[ 5.267711] ? __do_sys_getuid+0x3d/0x50
[ 5.267724] ? do_syscall_64+0x1a2/0x7c0
[ 5.267732] ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0
[ 5.267743] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80
[ 5.267752] ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80
[ 5.267765] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 5.267772] RIP: 0033:0x7aaa8b32a9fb
[ 5.267781] Code: c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 f3 0f 1e fa 31 f6 e9 05 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa b8 a6 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 05 c3 0f 1f 40 00 48 8b 15 e9 83 0d 00 f7 d8
[ 5.267787] RSP: 002b:00007ffd7c4c9468 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6
[ 5.267796] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 00005a61592a8b00 RCX: 00007aaa8b32a9fb
[ 5.267802] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00005a61592b2080
[ 5.267806] RBP: 00007ffd7c4c9540 R08: 00007aaa8b403b20 R09: 0000000000000020
[ 5.267812] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005a61592a8c00
[ 5.267817] R13: 00000000
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_core: Disable works on hci_unregister_dev
This make use of disable_work_* on hci_unregister_dev since the hci_dev is
about to be freed new submissions are not disarable. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mfd: arizona: Use pm_runtime_resume_and_get() to prevent refcnt leak
In arizona_clk32k_enable(), we should use pm_runtime_resume_and_get()
as pm_runtime_get_sync() will increase the refcnt even when it
returns an error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/MCE: Always save CS register on AMD Zen IF Poison errors
The Instruction Fetch (IF) units on current AMD Zen-based systems do not
guarantee a synchronous #MC is delivered for poison consumption errors.
Therefore, MCG_STATUS[EIPV|RIPV] will not be set. However, the
microarchitecture does guarantee that the exception is delivered within
the same context. In other words, the exact rIP is not known, but the
context is known to not have changed.
There is no architecturally-defined method to determine this behavior.
The Code Segment (CS) register is always valid on such IF unit poison
errors regardless of the value of MCG_STATUS[EIPV|RIPV].
Add a quirk to save the CS register for poison consumption from the IF
unit banks.
This is needed to properly determine the context of the error.
Otherwise, the severity grading function will assume the context is
IN_KERNEL due to the m->cs value being 0 (the initialized value). This
leads to unnecessary kernel panics on data poison errors due to the
kernel believing the poison consumption occurred in kernel context. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: uvcvideo: Handle cameras with invalid descriptors
If the source entity does not contain any pads, do not create a link. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
remoteproc: imx_dsp_rproc: Add custom memory copy implementation for i.MX DSP Cores
The IRAM is part of the HiFi DSP.
According to hardware specification only 32-bits write are allowed
otherwise we get a Kernel panic.
Therefore add a custom memory copy and memset functions to deal with
the above restriction. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: add vlan_get_protocol_and_depth() helper
Before blamed commit, pskb_may_pull() was used instead
of skb_header_pointer() in __vlan_get_protocol() and friends.
Few callers depended on skb->head being populated with MAC header,
syzbot caught one of them (skb_mac_gso_segment())
Add vlan_get_protocol_and_depth() to make the intent clearer
and use it where sensible.
This is a more generic fix than commit e9d3f80935b6
("net/af_packet: make sure to pull mac header") which was
dealing with a similar issue.
kernel BUG at include/linux/skbuff.h:2655 !
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN
CPU: 0 PID: 1441 Comm: syz-executor199 Not tainted 6.1.24-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/14/2023
RIP: 0010:__skb_pull include/linux/skbuff.h:2655 [inline]
RIP: 0010:skb_mac_gso_segment+0x68f/0x6a0 net/core/gro.c:136
Code: fd 48 8b 5c 24 10 44 89 6b 70 48 c7 c7 c0 ae 0d 86 44 89 e6 e8 a1 91 d0 00 48 c7 c7 00 af 0d 86 48 89 de 31 d2 e8 d1 4a e9 ff <0f> 0b 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41
RSP: 0018:ffffc90001bd7520 EFLAGS: 00010286
RAX: ffffffff8469736a RBX: ffff88810f31dac0 RCX: ffff888115a18b00
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc90001bd75e8 R08: ffffffff84697183 R09: fffff5200037adf9
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: dffffc0000000001 R12: 0000000000000012
R13: 000000000000fee5 R14: 0000000000005865 R15: 000000000000fed7
FS: 000055555633f300(0000) GS:ffff8881f6a00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000020000000 CR3: 0000000116fea000 CR4: 00000000003506f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
[<ffffffff847018dd>] __skb_gso_segment+0x32d/0x4c0 net/core/dev.c:3419
[<ffffffff8470398a>] skb_gso_segment include/linux/netdevice.h:4819 [inline]
[<ffffffff8470398a>] validate_xmit_skb+0x3aa/0xee0 net/core/dev.c:3725
[<ffffffff84707042>] __dev_queue_xmit+0x1332/0x3300 net/core/dev.c:4313
[<ffffffff851a9ec7>] dev_queue_xmit+0x17/0x20 include/linux/netdevice.h:3029
[<ffffffff851b4a82>] packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3111 [inline]
[<ffffffff851b4a82>] packet_sendmsg+0x49d2/0x6470 net/packet/af_packet.c:3142
[<ffffffff84669a12>] sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:716 [inline]
[<ffffffff84669a12>] sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:736 [inline]
[<ffffffff84669a12>] __sys_sendto+0x472/0x5f0 net/socket.c:2139
[<ffffffff84669c75>] __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2151 [inline]
[<ffffffff84669c75>] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2147 [inline]
[<ffffffff84669c75>] __x64_sys_sendto+0xe5/0x100 net/socket.c:2147
[<ffffffff8551d40f>] do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline]
[<ffffffff8551d40f>] do_syscall_64+0x2f/0x50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80
[<ffffffff85600087>] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0xcd |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ses: Handle enclosure with just a primary component gracefully
This reverts commit 3fe97ff3d949 ("scsi: ses: Don't attach if enclosure
has no components") and introduces proper handling of case where there are
no detected secondary components, but primary component (enumerated in
num_enclosures) does exist. That fix was originally proposed by Ding Hui
<dinghui@sangfor.com.cn>.
Completely ignoring devices that have one primary enclosure and no
secondary one results in ses_intf_add() bailing completely
scsi 2:0:0:254: enclosure has no enumerated components
scsi 2:0:0:254: Failed to bind enclosure -12ven in valid configurations such
even on valid configurations with 1 primary and 0 secondary enclosures as
below:
# sg_ses /dev/sg0
3PARdata SES 3321
Supported diagnostic pages:
Supported Diagnostic Pages [sdp] [0x0]
Configuration (SES) [cf] [0x1]
Short Enclosure Status (SES) [ses] [0x8]
# sg_ses -p cf /dev/sg0
3PARdata SES 3321
Configuration diagnostic page:
number of secondary subenclosures: 0
generation code: 0x0
enclosure descriptor list
Subenclosure identifier: 0 [primary]
relative ES process id: 0, number of ES processes: 1
number of type descriptor headers: 1
enclosure logical identifier (hex): 20000002ac02068d
enclosure vendor: 3PARdata product: VV rev: 3321
type descriptor header and text list
Element type: Unspecified, subenclosure id: 0
number of possible elements: 1
The changelog for the original fix follows
=====
We can get a crash when disconnecting the iSCSI session,
the call trace like this:
[ffff00002a00fb70] kfree at ffff00000830e224
[ffff00002a00fba0] ses_intf_remove at ffff000001f200e4
[ffff00002a00fbd0] device_del at ffff0000086b6a98
[ffff00002a00fc50] device_unregister at ffff0000086b6d58
[ffff00002a00fc70] __scsi_remove_device at ffff00000870608c
[ffff00002a00fca0] scsi_remove_device at ffff000008706134
[ffff00002a00fcc0] __scsi_remove_target at ffff0000087062e4
[ffff00002a00fd10] scsi_remove_target at ffff0000087064c0
[ffff00002a00fd70] __iscsi_unbind_session at ffff000001c872c4
[ffff00002a00fdb0] process_one_work at ffff00000810f35c
[ffff00002a00fe00] worker_thread at ffff00000810f648
[ffff00002a00fe70] kthread at ffff000008116e98
In ses_intf_add, components count could be 0, and kcalloc 0 size scomp,
but not saved in edev->component[i].scratch
In this situation, edev->component[0].scratch is an invalid pointer,
when kfree it in ses_intf_remove_enclosure, a crash like above would happen
The call trace also could be other random cases when kfree cannot catch
the invalid pointer
We should not use edev->component[] array when the components count is 0
We also need check index when use edev->component[] array in
ses_enclosure_data_process
===== |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: don't check PageError in __extent_writepage
__extent_writepage currenly sets PageError whenever any error happens,
and the also checks for PageError to decide if to call error handling.
This leads to very unclear responsibility for cleaning up on errors.
In the VM and generic writeback helpers the basic idea is that once
I/O is fired off all error handling responsibility is delegated to the
end I/O handler. But if that end I/O handler sets the PageError bit,
and the submitter checks it, the bit could in some cases leak into the
submission context for fast enough I/O.
Fix this by simply not checking PageError and just using the local
ret variable to check for submission errors. This also fundamentally
solves the long problem documented in a comment in __extent_writepage
by never leaking the error bit into the submission context. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: fcoe: Fix transport not deattached when fcoe_if_init() fails
fcoe_init() calls fcoe_transport_attach(&fcoe_sw_transport), but when
fcoe_if_init() fails, &fcoe_sw_transport is not detached and leaves freed
&fcoe_sw_transport on fcoe_transports list. This causes panic when
reinserting module.
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffbfff82e2213
RIP: 0010:fcoe_transport_attach+0xe1/0x230 [libfcoe]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
do_one_initcall+0xd0/0x4e0
load_module+0x5eee/0x7210
... |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm: bridge: adv7511: unregister cec i2c device after cec adapter
cec_unregister_adapter() assumes that the underlying adapter ops are
callable. For example, if the CEC adapter currently has a valid physical
address, then the unregistration procedure will invalidate the physical
address by setting it to f.f.f.f. Whence the following kernel oops
observed after removing the adv7511 module:
Unable to handle kernel execution of user memory at virtual address 0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 86000004 [#1] PREEMPT_RT SMP
Call trace:
0x0
adv7511_cec_adap_log_addr+0x1ac/0x1c8 [adv7511]
cec_adap_unconfigure+0x44/0x90 [cec]
__cec_s_phys_addr.part.0+0x68/0x230 [cec]
__cec_s_phys_addr+0x40/0x50 [cec]
cec_unregister_adapter+0xb4/0x118 [cec]
adv7511_remove+0x60/0x90 [adv7511]
i2c_device_remove+0x34/0xe0
device_release_driver_internal+0x114/0x1f0
driver_detach+0x54/0xe0
bus_remove_driver+0x60/0xd8
driver_unregister+0x34/0x60
i2c_del_driver+0x2c/0x68
adv7511_exit+0x1c/0x67c [adv7511]
__arm64_sys_delete_module+0x154/0x288
invoke_syscall+0x48/0x100
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x48/0xe8
do_el0_svc+0x28/0x88
el0_svc+0x1c/0x50
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa8/0xb0
el0t_64_sync+0x15c/0x160
Code: bad PC value
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Protect against this scenario by unregistering i2c_cec after
unregistering the CEC adapter. Duly disable the CEC clock afterwards
too. |
| A vulnerability in TeamViewer DEX Client (former 1E Client) - Content Distribution Service (NomadBranch.exe) prior version 25.11 for Windows allows malicious actors to coerce the service into transmitting data to an arbitrary internal IP address, potentially leaking sensitive information. |
| A vulnerability in TeamViewer DEX Client (former 1E client) - Content Distribution Service (NomadBranch.exe) prior version 25.11 for Windows allows malicious actors to bypass file integrity validation via a crafted request. By providing a valid hash for a malicious file, an attacker can cause the service to incorrectly validate and process the file as trusted, enabling arbitrary code execution under the Nomad Branch service context. |
| A vulnerability in TeamViewer DEX Client (former 1E Client) - Content Distribution Service (NomadBranch.exe) prior version 25.11 for Windows allows malicious actors to cause a denial of service (application crash) via a crafted command, resulting in service termination. |
| AdGuard DNS before 2.2 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via malformed UDP packets. |
| An issue was discovered in function d_abi_tags in file cp-demangle.c in BinUtils 2.26 allows attackers to cause a denial of service via crafted PE file. |
| An issue was discovered in function d_print_comp_inner in file cp-demangle.c in BinUtils 2.26 allows attackers to cause a denial of service via crafted PE file. |
