| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: iwlwifi: mvm: pick the version of SESSION_PROTECTION_NOTIF
When we want to know whether we should look for the mac_id or the
link_id in struct iwl_mvm_session_prot_notif, we should look at the
version of SESSION_PROTECTION_NOTIF.
This causes WARNINGs:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 11403 at drivers/net/wireless/intel/iwlwifi/mvm/time-event.c:959 iwl_mvm_rx_session_protect_notif+0x333/0x340 [iwlmvm]
RIP: 0010:iwl_mvm_rx_session_protect_notif+0x333/0x340 [iwlmvm]
Code: 00 49 c7 84 24 48 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 41 c6 84 24 78 07 00 00 ff 4c 89 f7 e8 e9 71 54 d9 e9 7d fd ff ff 0f 0b e9 23 fe ff ff <0f> 0b e9 1c fe ff ff 66 0f 1f 44 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
RSP: 0018:ffffb4bb00003d40 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9ae63a361000 RCX: ffff9ae4a98b60d4
RDX: ffff9ae4588499c0 RSI: 0000000000000305 RDI: ffff9ae4a98b6358
RBP: ffffb4bb00003d68 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000010
R10: ffffb4bb00003d00 R11: 000000000000000f R12: ffff9ae441399050
R13: ffff9ae4761329e8 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9ae7af400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055fb75680018 CR3: 00000003dae32006 CR4: 0000000000f70ef0
PKRU: 55555554
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
? show_regs+0x69/0x80
? __warn+0x8d/0x150
? iwl_mvm_rx_session_protect_notif+0x333/0x340 [iwlmvm]
? report_bug+0x196/0x1c0
? handle_bug+0x45/0x80
? exc_invalid_op+0x1c/0xb0
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30
? iwl_mvm_rx_session_protect_notif+0x333/0x340 [iwlmvm]
iwl_mvm_rx_common+0x115/0x340 [iwlmvm]
iwl_mvm_rx_mq+0xa6/0x100 [iwlmvm]
iwl_pcie_rx_handle+0x263/0xa10 [iwlwifi]
iwl_pcie_napi_poll_msix+0x32/0xd0 [iwlwifi] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: ucsi: Limit read size on v1.2
Between UCSI 1.2 and UCSI 2.0, the size of the MESSAGE_IN region was
increased from 16 to 256. In order to avoid overflowing reads for older
systems, add a mechanism to use the read UCSI version to truncate read
sizes on UCSI v1.2. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: PPC: Book3S HV: Fix stack handling in idle_kvm_start_guest()
In commit 10d91611f426 ("powerpc/64s: Reimplement book3s idle code in
C") kvm_start_guest() became idle_kvm_start_guest(). The old code
allocated a stack frame on the emergency stack, but didn't use the
frame to store anything, and also didn't store anything in its caller's
frame.
idle_kvm_start_guest() on the other hand is written more like a normal C
function, it creates a frame on entry, and also stores CR/LR into its
callers frame (per the ABI). The problem is that there is no caller
frame on the emergency stack.
The emergency stack for a given CPU is allocated with:
paca_ptrs[i]->emergency_sp = alloc_stack(limit, i) + THREAD_SIZE;
So emergency_sp actually points to the first address above the emergency
stack allocation for a given CPU, we must not store above it without
first decrementing it to create a frame. This is different to the
regular kernel stack, paca->kstack, which is initialised to point at an
initial frame that is ready to use.
idle_kvm_start_guest() stores the backchain, CR and LR all of which
write outside the allocation for the emergency stack. It then creates a
stack frame and saves the non-volatile registers. Unfortunately the
frame it creates is not large enough to fit the non-volatiles, and so
the saving of the non-volatile registers also writes outside the
emergency stack allocation.
The end result is that we corrupt whatever is at 0-24 bytes, and 112-248
bytes above the emergency stack allocation.
In practice this has gone unnoticed because the memory immediately above
the emergency stack happens to be used for other stack allocations,
either another CPUs mc_emergency_sp or an IRQ stack. See the order of
calls to irqstack_early_init() and emergency_stack_init().
The low addresses of another stack are the top of that stack, and so are
only used if that stack is under extreme pressue, which essentially
never happens in practice - and if it did there's a high likelyhood we'd
crash due to that stack overflowing.
Still, we shouldn't be corrupting someone else's stack, and it is purely
luck that we aren't corrupting something else.
To fix it we save CR/LR into the caller's frame using the existing r1 on
entry, we then create a SWITCH_FRAME_SIZE frame (which has space for
pt_regs) on the emergency stack with the backchain pointing to the
existing stack, and then finally we switch to the new frame on the
emergency stack. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm: Check output polling initialized before disabling
In drm_kms_helper_poll_disable() check if output polling
support is initialized before disabling polling. If not flag
this as a warning.
Additionally in drm_mode_config_helper_suspend() and
drm_mode_config_helper_resume() calls, that re the callers of these
functions, avoid invoking them if polling is not initialized.
For drivers like hyperv-drm, that do not initialize connector
polling, if suspend is called without this check, it leads to
suspend failure with following stack
[ 770.719392] Freezing remaining freezable tasks ... (elapsed 0.001 seconds) done.
[ 770.720592] printk: Suspending console(s) (use no_console_suspend to debug)
[ 770.948823] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 770.948824] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 17197 at kernel/workqueue.c:3162 __flush_work.isra.0+0x212/0x230
[ 770.948831] Modules linked in: rfkill nft_counter xt_conntrack xt_owner udf nft_compat crc_itu_t nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set nf_tables nfnetlink vfat fat mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core mlx5_core intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common kvm_amd ccp mlxfw kvm psample hyperv_drm tls drm_shmem_helper drm_kms_helper irqbypass pcspkr syscopyarea sysfillrect sysimgblt hv_balloon hv_utils joydev drm fuse xfs libcrc32c pci_hyperv pci_hyperv_intf sr_mod sd_mod cdrom t10_pi sg hv_storvsc scsi_transport_fc hv_netvsc serio_raw hyperv_keyboard hid_hyperv crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul crc32c_intel hv_vmbus ghash_clmulni_intel dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod
[ 770.948863] CPU: 1 PID: 17197 Comm: systemd-sleep Not tainted 5.14.0-362.2.1.el9_3.x86_64 #1
[ 770.948865] Hardware name: Microsoft Corporation Virtual Machine/Virtual Machine, BIOS Hyper-V UEFI Release v4.1 05/09/2022
[ 770.948866] RIP: 0010:__flush_work.isra.0+0x212/0x230
[ 770.948869] Code: 8b 4d 00 4c 8b 45 08 89 ca 48 c1 e9 04 83 e2 08 83 e1 0f 83 ca 02 89 c8 48 0f ba 6d 00 03 e9 25 ff ff ff 0f 0b e9 4e ff ff ff <0f> 0b 45 31 ed e9 44 ff ff ff e8 8f 89 b2 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00
[ 770.948870] RSP: 0018:ffffaf4ac213fb10 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 770.948871] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffffffff8c992857
[ 770.948872] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff9aad82b00330
[ 770.948873] RBP: ffff9aad82b00330 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9aad87ee3d10
[ 770.948874] R10: 0000000000000200 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff9aad82b00330
[ 770.948874] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001
[ 770.948875] FS: 00007ff1b2f6bb40(0000) GS:ffff9aaf37d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 770.948878] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 770.948878] CR2: 0000555f345cb666 CR3: 00000001462dc005 CR4: 0000000000370ee0
[ 770.948879] Call Trace:
[ 770.948880] <TASK>
[ 770.948881] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
[ 770.948884] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1c4/0x2df
[ 770.948886] ? __cancel_work_timer+0x103/0x190
[ 770.948887] ? __flush_work.isra.0+0x212/0x230
[ 770.948889] ? __warn+0x81/0x110
[ 770.948891] ? __flush_work.isra.0+0x212/0x230
[ 770.948892] ? report_bug+0x10a/0x140
[ 770.948895] ? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
[ 770.948898] ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
[ 770.948899] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[ 770.948903] ? __flush_work.isra.0+0x212/0x230
[ 770.948905] __cancel_work_timer+0x103/0x190
[ 770.948907] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0xa/0x30
[ 770.948910] drm_kms_helper_poll_disable+0x1e/0x40 [drm_kms_helper]
[ 770.948923] drm_mode_config_helper_suspend+0x1c/0x80 [drm_kms_helper]
[ 770.948933] ? __pfx_vmbus_suspend+0x10/0x10 [hv_vmbus]
[ 770.948942] hyperv_vmbus_suspend+0x17/0x40 [hyperv_drm]
[ 770.948944] ? __pfx_vmbus_suspend+0x10/0x10 [hv_vmbus]
[ 770.948951] dpm_run_callback+0x4c/0x140
[ 770.948954] __device_suspend_noir
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Skip do PCI error slot reset during RAS recovery
Why:
The PCI error slot reset maybe triggered after inject ue to UMC multi times, this
caused system hang.
[ 557.371857] amdgpu 0000:af:00.0: amdgpu: GPU reset succeeded, trying to resume
[ 557.373718] [drm] PCIE GART of 512M enabled.
[ 557.373722] [drm] PTB located at 0x0000031FED700000
[ 557.373788] [drm] VRAM is lost due to GPU reset!
[ 557.373789] [drm] PSP is resuming...
[ 557.547012] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: mlx5_pci_err_detected Device state = 1 pci_status: 0. Exit, result = 3, need reset
[ 557.547067] [drm] PCI error: detected callback, state(1)!!
[ 557.547069] [drm] No support for XGMI hive yet...
[ 557.548125] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: mlx5_pci_slot_reset Device state = 1 pci_status: 0. Enter
[ 557.607763] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: wait vital counter value 0x16b5b after 1 iterations
[ 557.607777] mlx5_core 0000:55:00.0: mlx5_pci_slot_reset Device state = 1 pci_status: 1. Exit, err = 0, result = 5, recovered
[ 557.610492] [drm] PCI error: slot reset callback!!
...
[ 560.689382] amdgpu 0000:3f:00.0: amdgpu: GPU reset(2) succeeded!
[ 560.689546] amdgpu 0000:5a:00.0: amdgpu: GPU reset(2) succeeded!
[ 560.689562] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0x5f080b54534f611f: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
[ 560.701008] CPU: 16 PID: 2361 Comm: kworker/u448:9 Tainted: G OE 5.15.0-91-generic #101-Ubuntu
[ 560.712057] Hardware name: Microsoft C278A/C278A, BIOS C2789.5.BS.1C11.AG.1 11/08/2023
[ 560.720959] Workqueue: amdgpu-reset-hive amdgpu_ras_do_recovery [amdgpu]
[ 560.728887] RIP: 0010:amdgpu_device_gpu_recover.cold+0xbf1/0xcf5 [amdgpu]
[ 560.736891] Code: ff 41 89 c6 e9 1b ff ff ff 44 0f b6 45 b0 e9 4f ff ff ff be 01 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 76 c9 8b ff 44 0f b6 45 b0 e9 3c fd ff ff <48> 83 ba 18 02 00 00 00 0f 84 6a f8 ff ff 48 8d 7a 78 be 01 00 00
[ 560.757967] RSP: 0018:ffa0000032e53d80 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 560.763848] RAX: ffa00000001dfd10 RBX: ffa0000000197090 RCX: ffa0000032e53db0
[ 560.771856] RDX: 5f080b54534f5f07 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ff11000128100010
[ 560.779867] RBP: ffa0000032e53df0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffffffe77f08
[ 560.787879] R10: 0000000000ffff0a R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000000000
[ 560.795889] R13: ffa0000032e53e00 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 560.803889] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ff11007e7e800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 560.812973] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 560.819422] CR2: 000055a04c118e68 CR3: 0000000007410005 CR4: 0000000000771ee0
[ 560.827433] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 560.835433] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe07f0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 560.843444] PKRU: 55555554
[ 560.846480] Call Trace:
[ 560.849225] <TASK>
[ 560.851580] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1d6/0x2ea
[ 560.856488] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1d6/0x2ea
[ 560.861379] ? amdgpu_ras_do_recovery+0x1b2/0x210 [amdgpu]
[ 560.867778] ? show_regs.part.0+0x23/0x29
[ 560.872293] ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0xd
[ 560.876502] ? die_addr+0x3e/0x60
[ 560.880238] ? exc_general_protection+0x1c5/0x410
[ 560.885532] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x27/0x30
[ 560.891025] ? amdgpu_device_gpu_recover.cold+0xbf1/0xcf5 [amdgpu]
[ 560.898323] amdgpu_ras_do_recovery+0x1b2/0x210 [amdgpu]
[ 560.904520] process_one_work+0x228/0x3d0
How:
In RAS recovery, mode-1 reset is issued from RAS fatal error handling and expected
all the nodes in a hive to be reset. no need to issue another mode-1 during this procedure. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: turn folio_test_hugetlb into a PageType
The current folio_test_hugetlb() can be fooled by a concurrent folio split
into returning true for a folio which has never belonged to hugetlbfs.
This can't happen if the caller holds a refcount on it, but we have a few
places (memory-failure, compaction, procfs) which do not and should not
take a speculative reference.
Since hugetlb pages do not use individual page mapcounts (they are always
fully mapped and use the entire_mapcount field to record the number of
mappings), the PageType field is available now that page_mapcount()
ignores the value in this field.
In compaction and with CONFIG_DEBUG_VM enabled, the current implementation
can result in an oops, as reported by Luis. This happens since 9c5ccf2db04b
("mm: remove HUGETLB_PAGE_DTOR") effectively added some VM_BUG_ON() checks
in the PageHuge() testing path.
[willy@infradead.org: update vmcoreinfo] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dpll: fix dpll_pin_on_pin_register() for multiple parent pins
In scenario where pin is registered with multiple parent pins via
dpll_pin_on_pin_register(..), all belonging to the same dpll device.
A second call to dpll_pin_on_pin_unregister(..) would cause a call trace,
as it tries to use already released registration resources (due to fix
introduced in b446631f355e). In this scenario pin was registered twice,
so resources are not yet expected to be release until each registered
pin/pin pair is unregistered.
Currently, the following crash/call trace is produced when ice driver is
removed on the system with installed E810T NIC which includes dpll device:
WARNING: CPU: 51 PID: 9155 at drivers/dpll/dpll_core.c:809 dpll_pin_ops+0x20/0x30
RIP: 0010:dpll_pin_ops+0x20/0x30
Call Trace:
? __warn+0x7f/0x130
? dpll_pin_ops+0x20/0x30
dpll_msg_add_pin_freq+0x37/0x1d0
dpll_cmd_pin_get_one+0x1c0/0x400
? __nlmsg_put+0x63/0x80
dpll_pin_event_send+0x93/0x140
dpll_pin_on_pin_unregister+0x3f/0x100
ice_dpll_deinit_pins+0xa1/0x230 [ice]
ice_remove+0xf1/0x210 [ice]
Fix by adding a parent pointer as a cookie when creating a registration,
also when searching for it. For the regular pins pass NULL, this allows to
create separated registration for each parent the pin is registered with. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: ptdma: Fix the error handling path in pt_core_init()
In order to free resources correctly in the error handling path of
pt_core_init(), 2 goto's have to be switched. Otherwise, some resources
will leak and we will try to release things that have not been allocated
yet.
Also move a dev_err() to a place where it is more meaningful. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ks8851: Handle softirqs at the end of IRQ thread to fix hang
The ks8851_irq() thread may call ks8851_rx_pkts() in case there are
any packets in the MAC FIFO, which calls netif_rx(). This netif_rx()
implementation is guarded by local_bh_disable() and local_bh_enable().
The local_bh_enable() may call do_softirq() to run softirqs in case
any are pending. One of the softirqs is net_rx_action, which ultimately
reaches the driver .start_xmit callback. If that happens, the system
hangs. The entire call chain is below:
ks8851_start_xmit_par from netdev_start_xmit
netdev_start_xmit from dev_hard_start_xmit
dev_hard_start_xmit from sch_direct_xmit
sch_direct_xmit from __dev_queue_xmit
__dev_queue_xmit from __neigh_update
__neigh_update from neigh_update
neigh_update from arp_process.constprop.0
arp_process.constprop.0 from __netif_receive_skb_one_core
__netif_receive_skb_one_core from process_backlog
process_backlog from __napi_poll.constprop.0
__napi_poll.constprop.0 from net_rx_action
net_rx_action from __do_softirq
__do_softirq from call_with_stack
call_with_stack from do_softirq
do_softirq from __local_bh_enable_ip
__local_bh_enable_ip from netif_rx
netif_rx from ks8851_irq
ks8851_irq from irq_thread_fn
irq_thread_fn from irq_thread
irq_thread from kthread
kthread from ret_from_fork
The hang happens because ks8851_irq() first locks a spinlock in
ks8851_par.c ks8851_lock_par() spin_lock_irqsave(&ksp->lock, ...)
and with that spinlock locked, calls netif_rx(). Once the execution
reaches ks8851_start_xmit_par(), it calls ks8851_lock_par() again
which attempts to claim the already locked spinlock again, and the
hang happens.
Move the do_softirq() call outside of the spinlock protected section
of ks8851_irq() by disabling BHs around the entire spinlock protected
section of ks8851_irq() handler. Place local_bh_enable() outside of
the spinlock protected section, so that it can trigger do_softirq()
without the ks8851_par.c ks8851_lock_par() spinlock being held, and
safely call ks8851_start_xmit_par() without attempting to lock the
already locked spinlock.
Since ks8851_irq() is protected by local_bh_disable()/local_bh_enable()
now, replace netif_rx() with __netif_rx() which is not duplicating the
local_bh_disable()/local_bh_enable() calls. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: Fix loading 64-bit NOMMU kernels past the start of RAM
commit 3335068f8721 ("riscv: Use PUD/P4D/PGD pages for the linear
mapping") added logic to allow using RAM below the kernel load address.
However, this does not work for NOMMU, where PAGE_OFFSET is fixed to the
kernel load address. Since that range of memory corresponds to PFNs
below ARCH_PFN_OFFSET, mm initialization runs off the beginning of
mem_map and corrupts adjacent kernel memory. Fix this by restoring the
previous behavior for NOMMU kernels. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mtd: parsers: qcom: Fix missing free for pparts in cleanup
Mtdpart doesn't free pparts when a cleanup function is declared.
Add missing free for pparts in cleanup function for smem to fix the
leak. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: idxd: Convert spinlock to mutex to lock evl workqueue
drain_workqueue() cannot be called safely in a spinlocked context due to
possible task rescheduling. In the multi-task scenario, calling
queue_work() while drain_workqueue() will lead to a Call Trace as
pushing a work on a draining workqueue is not permitted in spinlocked
context.
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? __warn+0x7d/0x140
? __queue_work+0x2b2/0x440
? report_bug+0x1f8/0x200
? handle_bug+0x3c/0x70
? exc_invalid_op+0x18/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20
? __queue_work+0x2b2/0x440
queue_work_on+0x28/0x30
idxd_misc_thread+0x303/0x5a0 [idxd]
? __schedule+0x369/0xb40
? __pfx_irq_thread_fn+0x10/0x10
? irq_thread+0xbc/0x1b0
irq_thread_fn+0x21/0x70
irq_thread+0x102/0x1b0
? preempt_count_add+0x74/0xa0
? __pfx_irq_thread_dtor+0x10/0x10
? __pfx_irq_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x103/0x140
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x31/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
</TASK>
The current implementation uses a spinlock to protect event log workqueue
and will lead to the Call Trace due to potential task rescheduling.
To address the locking issue, convert the spinlock to mutex, allowing
the drain_workqueue() to be called in a safe mutex-locked context.
This change ensures proper synchronization when accessing the event log
workqueue, preventing potential Call Trace and improving the overall
robustness of the code. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath11k: decrease MHI channel buffer length to 8KB
Currently buf_len field of ath11k_mhi_config_qca6390 is assigned
with 0, making MHI use a default size, 64KB, to allocate channel
buffers. This is likely to fail in some scenarios where system
memory is highly fragmented and memory compaction or reclaim is
not allowed.
There is a fail report which is caused by it:
kworker/u32:45: page allocation failure: order:4, mode:0x40c00(GFP_NOIO|__GFP_COMP), nodemask=(null),cpuset=/,mems_allowed=0
CPU: 0 PID: 19318 Comm: kworker/u32:45 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc3-1.gae4495f-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed (unreleased) 493b6d5b382c603654d7a81fc3c144d59a1dfceb
Workqueue: events_unbound async_run_entry_fn
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x47/0x60
warn_alloc+0x13a/0x1b0
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
? __alloc_pages_direct_compact+0xab/0x210
__alloc_pages_slowpath.constprop.0+0xd3e/0xda0
__alloc_pages+0x32d/0x350
? mhi_prepare_channel+0x127/0x2d0 [mhi 40df44e07c05479f7a6e7b90fba9f0e0031a7814]
__kmalloc_large_node+0x72/0x110
__kmalloc+0x37c/0x480
? mhi_map_single_no_bb+0x77/0xf0 [mhi 40df44e07c05479f7a6e7b90fba9f0e0031a7814]
? mhi_prepare_channel+0x127/0x2d0 [mhi 40df44e07c05479f7a6e7b90fba9f0e0031a7814]
mhi_prepare_channel+0x127/0x2d0 [mhi 40df44e07c05479f7a6e7b90fba9f0e0031a7814]
__mhi_prepare_for_transfer+0x44/0x80 [mhi 40df44e07c05479f7a6e7b90fba9f0e0031a7814]
? __pfx_____mhi_prepare_for_transfer+0x10/0x10 [mhi 40df44e07c05479f7a6e7b90fba9f0e0031a7814]
device_for_each_child+0x5c/0xa0
? __pfx_pci_pm_resume+0x10/0x10
ath11k_core_resume+0x65/0x100 [ath11k a5094e22d7223135c40d93c8f5321cf09fd85e4e]
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
ath11k_pci_pm_resume+0x32/0x60 [ath11k_pci 830b7bfc3ea80ebef32e563cafe2cb55e9cc73ec]
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
dpm_run_callback+0x8c/0x1e0
device_resume+0x104/0x340
? __pfx_dpm_watchdog_handler+0x10/0x10
async_resume+0x1d/0x30
async_run_entry_fn+0x32/0x120
process_one_work+0x168/0x330
worker_thread+0x2f5/0x410
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xe8/0x120
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x34/0x50
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
</TASK>
Actually those buffers are used only by QMI target -> host communication.
And for WCN6855 and QCA6390, the largest packet size for that is less
than 6KB. So change buf_len field to 8KB, which results in order 1
allocation if page size is 4KB. In this way, we can at least save some
memory, and as well as decrease the possibility of allocation failure
in those scenarios.
Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.0 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-03125-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_LITE-3.6510.30 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm/a4xx: fix error handling in a4xx_gpu_init()
This code returns 1 on error instead of a negative error. It leads to
an Oops in the caller. A second problem is that the check for
"if (ret != -ENODATA)" cannot be true because "ret" is set to 1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: buffer: Fix file related error handling in IIO_BUFFER_GET_FD_IOCTL
If we fail to copy the just created file descriptor to userland, we
try to clean up by putting back 'fd' and freeing 'ib'. The code uses
put_unused_fd() for the former which is wrong, as the file descriptor
was already published by fd_install() which gets called internally by
anon_inode_getfd().
This makes the error handling code leaving a half cleaned up file
descriptor table around and a partially destructed 'file' object,
allowing userland to play use-after-free tricks on us, by abusing
the still usable fd and making the code operate on a dangling
'file->private_data' pointer.
Instead of leaving the kernel in a partially corrupted state, don't
attempt to explicitly clean up and leave this to the process exit
path that'll release any still valid fds, including the one created
by the previous call to anon_inode_getfd(). Simply return -EFAULT to
indicate the error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
phy: ti: Fix missing sentinel for clk_div_table
_get_table_maxdiv() tries to access "clk_div_table" array out of bound
defined in phy-j721e-wiz.c. Add a sentinel entry to prevent
the following global-out-of-bounds error reported by enabling KASAN.
[ 9.552392] BUG: KASAN: global-out-of-bounds in _get_maxdiv+0xc0/0x148
[ 9.558948] Read of size 4 at addr ffff8000095b25a4 by task kworker/u4:1/38
[ 9.565926]
[ 9.567441] CPU: 1 PID: 38 Comm: kworker/u4:1 Not tainted 5.16.0-116492-gdaadb3bd0e8d-dirty #360
[ 9.576242] Hardware name: Texas Instruments J721e EVM (DT)
[ 9.581832] Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func
[ 9.587708] Call trace:
[ 9.590174] dump_backtrace+0x20c/0x218
[ 9.594038] show_stack+0x18/0x68
[ 9.597375] dump_stack_lvl+0x9c/0xd8
[ 9.601062] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x78/0x334
[ 9.606830] kasan_report+0x1f0/0x260
[ 9.610517] __asan_load4+0x9c/0xd8
[ 9.614030] _get_maxdiv+0xc0/0x148
[ 9.617540] divider_determine_rate+0x88/0x488
[ 9.622005] divider_round_rate_parent+0xc8/0x124
[ 9.626729] wiz_clk_div_round_rate+0x54/0x68
[ 9.631113] clk_core_determine_round_nolock+0x124/0x158
[ 9.636448] clk_core_round_rate_nolock+0x68/0x138
[ 9.641260] clk_core_set_rate_nolock+0x268/0x3a8
[ 9.645987] clk_set_rate+0x50/0xa8
[ 9.649499] cdns_sierra_phy_init+0x88/0x248
[ 9.653794] phy_init+0x98/0x108
[ 9.657046] cdns_pcie_enable_phy+0xa0/0x170
[ 9.661340] cdns_pcie_init_phy+0x250/0x2b0
[ 9.665546] j721e_pcie_probe+0x4b8/0x798
[ 9.669579] platform_probe+0x8c/0x108
[ 9.673350] really_probe+0x114/0x630
[ 9.677037] __driver_probe_device+0x18c/0x220
[ 9.681505] driver_probe_device+0xac/0x150
[ 9.685712] __device_attach_driver+0xec/0x170
[ 9.690178] bus_for_each_drv+0xf0/0x158
[ 9.694124] __device_attach+0x184/0x210
[ 9.698070] device_initial_probe+0x14/0x20
[ 9.702277] bus_probe_device+0xec/0x100
[ 9.706223] deferred_probe_work_func+0x124/0x180
[ 9.710951] process_one_work+0x4b0/0xbc0
[ 9.714983] worker_thread+0x74/0x5d0
[ 9.718668] kthread+0x214/0x230
[ 9.721919] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 9.725520]
[ 9.727032] The buggy address belongs to the variable:
[ 9.732183] clk_div_table+0x24/0x440 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/fpu: Ensure shadow stack is active before "getting" registers
The x86 shadow stack support has its own set of registers. Those registers
are XSAVE-managed, but they are "supervisor state components" which means
that userspace can not touch them with XSAVE/XRSTOR. It also means that
they are not accessible from the existing ptrace ABI for XSAVE state.
Thus, there is a new ptrace get/set interface for it.
The regset code that ptrace uses provides an ->active() handler in
addition to the get/set ones. For shadow stack this ->active() handler
verifies that shadow stack is enabled via the ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK bit in the
thread struct. The ->active() handler is checked from some call sites of
the regset get/set handlers, but not the ptrace ones. This was not
understood when shadow stack support was put in place.
As a result, both the set/get handlers can be called with
XFEATURE_CET_USER in its init state, which would cause get_xsave_addr() to
return NULL and trigger a WARN_ON(). The ssp_set() handler luckily has an
ssp_active() check to avoid surprising the kernel with shadow stack
behavior when the kernel is not ready for it (ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK==0). That
check just happened to avoid the warning.
But the ->get() side wasn't so lucky. It can be called with shadow stacks
disabled, triggering the warning in practice, as reported by Christina
Schimpe:
WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 1773 at arch/x86/kernel/fpu/regset.c:198 ssp_get+0x89/0xa0
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_regs+0x6e/0x80
? ssp_get+0x89/0xa0
? __warn+0x91/0x150
? ssp_get+0x89/0xa0
? report_bug+0x19d/0x1b0
? handle_bug+0x46/0x80
? exc_invalid_op+0x1d/0x80
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30
? __pfx_ssp_get+0x10/0x10
? ssp_get+0x89/0xa0
? ssp_get+0x52/0xa0
__regset_get+0xad/0xf0
copy_regset_to_user+0x52/0xc0
ptrace_regset+0x119/0x140
ptrace_request+0x13c/0x850
? wait_task_inactive+0x142/0x1d0
? do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x90
arch_ptrace+0x102/0x300
[...]
Ensure that shadow stacks are active in a thread before looking them up
in the XSAVE buffer. Since ARCH_SHSTK_SHSTK and user_ssp[SHSTK_EN] are
set at the same time, the active check ensures that there will be
something to find in the XSAVE buffer.
[ dhansen: changelog/subject tweaks ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
userfaultfd: fix a race between writeprotect and exit_mmap()
A race is possible when a process exits, its VMAs are removed by
exit_mmap() and at the same time userfaultfd_writeprotect() is called.
The race was detected by KASAN on a development kernel, but it appears
to be possible on vanilla kernels as well.
Use mmget_not_zero() to prevent the race as done in other userfaultfd
operations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: fix data corruption after conversion from inline format
Commit 6dbf7bb55598 ("fs: Don't invalidate page buffers in
block_write_full_page()") uncovered a latent bug in ocfs2 conversion
from inline inode format to a normal inode format.
The code in ocfs2_convert_inline_data_to_extents() attempts to zero out
the whole cluster allocated for file data by grabbing, zeroing, and
dirtying all pages covering this cluster. However these pages are
beyond i_size, thus writeback code generally ignores these dirty pages
and no blocks were ever actually zeroed on the disk.
This oversight was fixed by commit 693c241a5f6a ("ocfs2: No need to zero
pages past i_size.") for standard ocfs2 write path, inline conversion
path was apparently forgotten; the commit log also has a reasoning why
the zeroing actually is not needed.
After commit 6dbf7bb55598, things became worse as writeback code stopped
invalidating buffers on pages beyond i_size and thus these pages end up
with clean PageDirty bit but with buffers attached to these pages being
still dirty. So when a file is converted from inline format, then
writeback triggers, and then the file is grown so that these pages
become valid, the invalid dirtiness state is preserved,
mark_buffer_dirty() does nothing on these pages (buffers are already
dirty) but page is never written back because it is clean. So data
written to these pages is lost once pages are reclaimed.
Simple reproducer for the problem is:
xfs_io -f -c "pwrite 0 2000" -c "pwrite 2000 2000" -c "fsync" \
-c "pwrite 4000 2000" ocfs2_file
After unmounting and mounting the fs again, you can observe that end of
'ocfs2_file' has lost its contents.
Fix the problem by not doing the pointless zeroing during conversion
from inline format similarly as in the standard write path.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix whitespace, per Joseph] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: Avoid crash from unnecessary IDA free
In the remove path, there is an attempt to free the aux_idx IDA whether
it was allocated or not. This can potentially cause a crash when
unloading the driver on systems that do not initialize support for RDMA.
But, this free cannot be gated by the status bit for RDMA, since it is
allocated if the driver detects support for RDMA at probe time, but the
driver can enter into a state where RDMA is not supported after the IDA
has been allocated at probe time and this would lead to a memory leak.
Initialize aux_idx to an invalid value and check for a valid value when
unloading to determine if an IDA free is necessary. |
